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Chapter 1: this paper studies the economic impact of president Xi Jinping’s Eight Regulations of 
Austerity and coordinated anti-corruption campaign. Specifically, I examine the effects of this 
campaign on the pattern of household expenditures in China using a triple differences approach. I 
compare the expenditures of households with government employees with those households without 
government employees, before and after the anti-corruption reform, across commodities that are likely 
to be subject to corruption compared to those that are not. I show that in the post-reform period, 
government affiliated families spend relatively more on goods that they are likely to have obtained 
illegally through bribes before. In contrast, expenditure patterns for goods that are less likely to be 
subject to corruption do not exhibit a relative increase in the post-reform period. These expenditure 
changes are largest for low level officials’ families and the bulk of the increase occurred for non-
Chinese Communist Party member government employees and among those outside President Xi 
Jinping’s powerbase. This suggests that those with the strongest ties to the party were able to avoid 
the effects of the anti-corruption campaign. 
 
Chapter 2: While the Chinese government’s stated position is religious freedom, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) is officially atheist. Individuals who profess a faith are typically unable to join 
and members who practice a religion face expulsion and a loss of benefits. It is unknown exactly how 
much these policies play a role in shaping t religious affiliation in China. For instance, through 
assortative matching, non-religious individuals may simply have been those who would have joined 
the CCP regardless. This paper studies the extent to which the CCP’s policies regarding religion may 
influence religious identification over the life cycle in China. To do so, I contrast changes in religious 
affiliation before and after retirement for CCP members and non-CCP members. In theory, 
individuals who were in the CCP but religious may have chosen to hide these beliefs while working in 
order to not lose out on party benefits. I find no evidence of any increase in membership after 
retirement – suggesting either: (1) individuals who are non-religious in the CCP simply choose to 
remain so after retirement or (2) some degree of lingering benefits associated with CCP membership 
even after government employment ends are large enough to disincentivize religious uptake.   
 
Chapter 3: This paper investigates the impact of the Arab Spring protests on missing women in Egypt 
through a spatial Differences-in-Differences analysis. We compare the missing women in high protest 
intensity governates with those in low protest intensity governorates; before and after the Arab Spring 
xi 
 
across different phases of the Arab Spring and across different age groups. The results reflect the 
different effects of different protest on missing women in the Arab Spring and effects in different age 
groups. The empirical results indicate that after the Arab Spring movement, the missing women 
significantly decreased in high protest intensity areas, suggesting that the Arab Spring saved many 
women. Furthermore, the missing women decreased more after the third phase of the Arab Spring. 
Last but not least, we find that the number of missing women decreased more in younger age group, 






Chapter 1: How Effective is China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign? Evidence 
from Consumer Expenditures 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the start of its free-market reforms in 1978, the Chinese government has faced an increasing and 
more wide-spread corruption problem, which accompanied its rapid economic growth and economic 
development process (Wedeman, 2012; Dong & Torgler, 2013). The effects of previous anti-
corruption policies of the Chinese government is not significant compared with President Xi Jinping’s 
anti-corruption campaign (Andrew Wedeman, 2012). This lack of accountability and enforcement of 
anti-corruption policies appears to have changed with President Xi Jinping’s Eight Regulations of 
Austerity and coordinated anti-corruption campaign at the end of 2012.1 On May 17, 2013, the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) began a new anti-corruption policy.2 The partial effects 
of this reform can be seen in Figure 1, which shows a significant increase in the number of high-
ranking government officials who have been convicted of corruption after 2012.3 
Before President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, existing evidence suggests that a wide 
range of Chinese government system workers, including public servants, employees at state-owned 
firms, and government institutional staff, regularly received illegal benefits through two main channels 
(China Corruption Report, 2020). The first and most common form is gifts, such as outside free 
lunches or dinners, personal usage of government vehicles, free traveling, free movie tickets, free art 
performance tickets, and entertainment discount bonus ticket. These gifts substitute for regular 
expenditures government employees would have otherwise purchased out of their budgets. The 
second form of corruption is illegal sources of cash income, such as bribes from private sector firms 
or cash and other forms of embezzlement from public funds. In theory, and anecdotally, higher-
ranked level government employees are more likely to get cash bribes, while lower ranked officials are 
more likely to receive free expenditure benefits, i.e., in-kind benefits, through bribery.  
President Xi Jinping’s Eight Regulations of Austerity sought to cut down on illegal benefits such 
 
1 Resolution of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, January 1997 Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection convened eight meetings for anti-corruption. “Establishing and improving education, the legal 
system, punishment, monitoring and prevent corruption implement essentials” in 2005. “Establishing and improving 
punishment and prevent corruption system 2008-2012 work plan” in 2008. 
2 Eight Regulations of Austerity introduction is in Appendix page 1. The Eight Regulations of Austerity mainly focuses 
on reducing public funding loss which the government system people always use public funding for their private purpose 
and bribes from private companies. The CCDI inspected more than 270,000 bureaucrats at different levels May 2013. 
3 High ranking means provincial and ministerial level in this paper. In China, investigation process means that the 
investigated governors should stop work and in the house of detention. 
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as government system workers' receiving gifts, meanwhile additional corresponding anticorruption 
campaign rules focused on government system workers’ cash bribes. The CCDI inspections, the 
supervision mechanism, checks whether Eight Regulations of Austerity and other coordinated anti-
corruption policies are implemented well. According to academic studies and journalistic reports, the 
anti-corruption campaign directly sought to limit the government system workers’ illegal subsidies and 
perks, such as meals, cars, travel, and outing (South China Morning Post 2019), also decrease the car 
and entertainment expenditures (Cai et al. 2004; Dong & Benno, 2013). In the empirical analysis, I 
classify consumption expenditures of these forms as susceptible to corruption (affected expenditure) 
and classify other forms of consumption expenditure as less susceptible to corruption (non-affected 
expenditure).4 
In this paper, I use a set of differences to study whether President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
campaign affects expenditure behavior. To do this, I examine affected expenditure and non-affected 
expenditure, between government and non-government households, before and after the 2012 anti-
corruption campaign. I show that in the post-reform period, government affiliated families spend 
relatively more on expenditure categories that they previously likely received illegal benefits from, 
while expenditure patterns for goods that are not easily subject to corruption do not exhibit a relative 
increase. To better understand the underlying changes across different segments of the society 
occurring as a result of this change, I also conduct a quintile analysis. This reveals that most 
expenditure changes occur among the lower-level officials and their families. I also divide the sample 
into Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members and non-members and show that only non-CCP 
member government officials were forced to increase their expenditures. Similarly, I find that those 
government officials in President Xi Jinping’s traditional powerbase provinces were the least affected. 
This suggests that CCP members, those with the strongest ties to the government, might have avoided 
the anti-corruption campaign and continue to receive corrupt benefits after the reform.  
Recent research also highlights the effect of the anti-corruption campaign on public worker 
expenditures on luxury items. Particularly, Ke, Liu, and Tang (2018) find that total expenditures on 
luxury alcohol and high-end hotels decrease significantly while expenditures on regular hotels remain 
unaffected after the campaign. Likewise, Qian and Wen (2015) study the effect of the anti-corruption 
campaign on imported luxury goods expenditures such as jewelry and find that these expenditures 
 
4  Affected expenditure comprises eating out, car expenditure, other private transportation expenditure, public 
transportation, tourism, entertainment, and durable goods expenditure. Non-affected expenditure includes health 
improvement expenditure, medical expenditure, education expenditure, communication expenditure, cloth, daily 
necessities, and cosmetics. 
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also significantly decrease as well (Qian and Wen, 2015). Xu and Yano (2016) also examine the effects 
of President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign on economic growth through innovation and find 
that more private sources are used to research new production methods and development in 
companies with no political connections, non-state-owned enterprise, and younger firms. 
This paper makes multiple contributions to the literature on the effectiveness of anticorruption 
campaigns. Through classifying the households into government affiliated families and non-
government affiliated families and comparing the expenditures of households before and after this 
anti-corruption campaign, and using the information from the CFPS dataset, my first contribution is 
that I explore the effects of President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign on household level 
expenditures, including a comparison between the affected and non-affected expenditures groups. My 
findings suggest that the campaign did significantly alter consumer behavior in ways that are consistent 
with a reduction in graft in the economy. The second contribution is clearly identifying how these 
changes occurred. I show that lower-level government affiliated families must spend more on anti-
corruption affected goods, which were previously free or underpriced for them. The same is not true 
for higher ranking and higher income officials. While the extent of any cash bribes may have been 
influenced, the triple differences approach identifies only the associated increase in expenditure that 
should be observed should corrupt gifting be reduced. The third contribution is that I test if the source 
of increased affected expenditure of government affiliated households is from their legal income. 
Conclusively, the estimates clearly indicate that lower-ranked government households significantly 
spend more on the affected expenditure but not clear estimated results for higher-ranked government 
households. Perhaps most interesting, I show that CCP members and those residing in the traditional 
powerbase provinces – namely, those with the strongest ties to the government, may still be able to 
receive corrupt benefits after the reform. The government affiliated families have begun to use their 
own income for expenditures that they received for free before. 
 
1.2 Background on anti-corruption scheme 
Corruption is frequently linked with country development, productivity, political gradation, and social 
fairness. The traditional view on corruption is distortion and costly for economic development 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). There is also substantial evidence that solving corruption problems can 
promote the country’s economy and improve corporate innovation and productivity (Murphy et 
al.,1993; Veracierto, 2008; Anokhin & Schulze, 2009; Ellis et al., 2020; Wellalage et al., 2020). Many 
researchers also specify that corruption can cause lower investment, higher inequality and informal 
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economy (Murphy et al., 1993; Mauro, 1995; Johnson et al., 2000). Others point out that even though 
corruption is undesirable, at least it creates some informal rules which people can follow (Chen et al., 
2016). These rules of the corruption game may informally help transactions because the bribes can be 
either the “grease” for a rigid bureaucracy and commerce (Lui 1985; Beck and Maher, 1986; 
Huntington, 2006) or the suboptimal allocation strategy (Lui 1985; Olson, 2000).  
Previous research on President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign have examined a host of 
other outcomes. Analyzing market supply side information, Ke et al. (2018) discovered that President 
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption policy counting the Eight Regulations of Austerity did not influence 
Chinese stock market shareholder’s value, but it did negatively affect the level of luxury goods and 
luxury hotels expenditure. Chen and Kung (2019) discussed the role of collusion between political 
entities and cash bribes by using a land transaction data set from 2004 to 2016. The power side is the 
local governments who sell the land to “businessmen” at favorable prices.5 The “businessman” in 
their analysis are members of China’s supreme political elites - the Politburo. These individuals get 
large profits and local governors in return receive political promotions as kickbacks. After President 
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, they find that the Politburo pay more for land acquisitions and 
that the promotion rate of local governors decreases. Meanwhile other papers discuss the special crony 
capitalism in China, which reckons all big private companies connected with governors compete with 
each other at the beginning and then merge to share different local markets to increase the firm scale 
(Bai et al., 2014).6 Fang et al. (2018) find that both corruption and innovation ability decide how 
Chinese provinces governments decide the allocation of government research and development 
subsidies. However, the anti-corruption effects of President Xi Jinping strengthen the relationship 
between innovation ability and the allocation of government research and development subsidies 
which increase research and development efficiency. This anti-corruption campaign also decreased 
the expenditures of imported luxury goods, such as imported jewelry (Nancy Qian and Jaya Wen 2015). 
In China, President Xi Jinping’s aggressive anti-corruption campaign, which launched on Dec 4th, 
2012, has changed the political environment and the structure of the economy. Even though there 
were anti-corruption policies before President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, the effects of 
those policies were small as shown in Figure 1. Among reasons why previous anti-corruption 
campaigns were ineffective, weak inspection system, long time between inspections, no internal 
 
5 “businessman” refers to the top governors’ family members. They can get many benefits to the big family. 
6 Crony capitalism, in China, means all the big profitable industries are controlled by top governors’ families, e.g., top local 
governors’ families, top provinces governors’ families, and top central governors’ families. 
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oversight of monitoring, a complex reporting system, and no highly visible prosecutions of high-level 
governors are cited (CCDI inspection team meeting, 2013; Regulations of the Communist Party of 
China on inspection work, 2015).  
To improve the anti-corruption campaign efficiency, President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
campaign reorganized the CCDI inspection team and increased inspection frequency (Central 
inspection team meeting, 2012-2017). The inspection target, which was not very specific, was made 
more concrete such as a local government accounting record. The second innovation was that 
inspection teams change their leaders frequently. This prevents forming close relationships between 
the inspection team and the inspected department. The third development is that every monitoring 
activity needs confirmation from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The fourth 
change is the addition of a simple and convenient online report system for all people (CCDI 
Inspection Team website, 2013, 2015, and 2017). The last development is the visible prosecution of 
high-level governors and other important government members, such as Xilai Bo, Member of Central 
Political Bureau; Zhou Yongkang, Politburo Standing Committee and Secretary of the Central 
Committee of Politics and Law; Boxiong Guo, members of the Politburo and vice president of the 
Central Military Commission; and Caihou Xu, Vice President of Central Military Commission. 
 
1.3 Data set 
To study this topic, I use the Chinese Family Panel Study (CFPS) from 2010 to 2018. This dataset 
includes disaggregated family level expenditures and individual demographic information in 2010, 
2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018.7 The CFPS is a tracking panel data set which randomly collects from 
twenty-five provinces and totally contains records on 54,568 households every other year. The family 
response rate is 81% and the tracking rate is 96.7%. The CFPS produces sample collection weights in 
different provinces because different provinces have their characters, such as population, environment 
and economics condition. As the 2010 wave does not have detailed expenditure categories, I just use 
the data set from 2012 to 2018 for basic regression and robustness check. However, for some 
robustness tests, I also include the 2010 data set because 2010 data set has the information on annually 
family total expenditure and government membership. 8  This dataset includes some specific 
 
7 More details on the CFPS is available from the user handbook, which is available online (Ding H (2012) Onsite sampling 
frame building in CFPS 2010 baseline survey (in Chinese). Technical Report, CFPS-2, Institute of Social Science Survey, 
Peking University, Beijing. Available at: https://opendata.pku.edu.cn/dataverse/CFPS). 
8 Placebo tests descriptions and results are in Appendix Tale A5. 
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expenditure categories, but it does not include all.  Because some expenditure items in this survey are 
not very specific, I cannot identify the elasticity of substitution between various expenditure categories. 
For example, car expenditures and other transportation expenditures are lumped together, and “other 
transportation expenditures” may also include motorcycle and public transportation. I tested the 
income elasticity of demand for subcategories in affected expenditures and non-affected expenditures 
in Table 2 before the regression analysis. A positive income elasticity means that as total family income 
increases all of these expenditures also increase. Furthermore, Figure 3 shows the average total family 
income for both government and non-government households, suggesting a parallel trend during the 
period analyzed.  
For identification purposes, it is more accurate to analyze household level expenditures because 
the individual expenditures could interact with the expenditures of other family members. This paper 
pools different expenditure categories into affected and non-affected expenditure groups using the 
existing expenditure information in the CFPS data set as well as previous research and news reports 
(Chen et al., 2017; Kung et al., 2019; Dong et al., 2013; Fang et al., 2018; Ke et al., 2018; Lin et al., 
2016; Qian & Wen, 2015; Xu et al., 2017).9 For example, South China Morning Post reported that “areas 
targeted for anti-corruption could include spending on meals, travel, stationery, and office 
plants, People's Daily reported. Civil servants at the bottom level have felt the impact. Wang says his 
department used to organize activities such as outings, meals, or gift-giving several times a year, but 
not anymore.” However, in the robustness section, I also check the sensitivity of my results to the 
composition of goods selected into the affected and non-affected groups.  
I classify households with at least one government member as government households. All 
households with no government members are non-government households. I use family level 
expenditure as the dependent variables and the household head demographic and households level 
information as control variables in the regression analysis.  
Table 1 shows the pooled summary statistics of variables used in the regression analysis by 
government and non-government groups including the demographic information on the household 
heads and the households’ level . The Chinese government system contains three different types of 
organizations in which individuals can work: the first group is comprised of public servants (also called 
civil servants) who directly works in the government administrative system, the second group are 
workers in the state-owned enterprise (SOE), and the third group are workers in public institutions, 
 
9 More details on the classification method are available in the Appendix. 
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such as hospitals, schools, and research centers. The “Job Characteristics” Panel indicates that the rate 
in the households with public servant household head is 0.02 in the full government system, the 
associated SOE household head rate is 0.04, and the institution household head rate is 0.03.  
The “Education Levels” Panel contains information on the education level of the household heads, 
suggesting that it is significantly higher for families with a government employee as the head. In “Basic 
Information” Panel, several differences between government and non-government affiliated 
households stand out. First, the minority rate is higher in non-government households than in the 
government system households. More government system families are living in urban areas where 
basic utility and social welfare is better than in rural areas. The government system household heads 
are on average five years younger than the non-government system household heads. The percentage 
of household heads who are female is similar in both government system families and non-
government system families. The family size and adult size of government system families are bigger 
than the non-government system families.  
Different regions in China, like in most developing countries, have divergent economic conditions 
and display significant heterogeneity. The eastern part is closer to the ocean and is comparatively richer 
and include major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Guangdong. The middle area is poorer 
than the east side of China, such as Anhui, Sichuan, and Henan. The western region is the poorest. 
To control for time invariant unobservable regional differences, in all regressions, I include a set of 
regional dummies.10 
In addition to basic demographic information, the CFPS also contains information on annual total 
family incomes, expenditures and expenditure categories as shown in Table 2. Household expenditures 
are presented in real terms based on the 2010 consumer prices. I classify all expenditures into two 
expenditure groups, those that are easily and commonly used as open to corruption are presented in 
the first panel which I label as “affected expenditures” while those that are less susceptible to graft is 
presented in the next panel and are subsequently referred to as “non-affected expenditures.” 
Expenditures are “affected” in the sense that we might expect them to change for households that 
were previously being given gifts that substituted for real consumption expenditure in those categories. 
To classify these categories, I rely on previous studies and newspaper reports (Lin et al., 2018; Qian 
& Wen, 2015; Cai et al., 2004; Ke et al,. 2018; Chen & Zhong, 2017; Zhang, 2019).  
 
10 Further details on demographics disaggregated by survey year are presented in Appendix Table A1. 
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From Table 2, the affected expenditure group includes eating out, car expenditure, transportation 
expenditures, tourism, and entertainment expenditures. On average, this affected real expenditure is 
20,452 RMB (around 3,075 USD in 2020 exchange rate) in government households, which is 
significantly higher than overall affected expenditure in the non-government households. Non-
affected expenditures contain health expenditures, medical expenditures, education expenditures, 
communication expenditures, clothing expenditures, other necessities expenditures, durable goods 
expenditures, and cosmetic expenditures. Even though the non-affected consumption expenditures 
of government households are also significantly higher than the related consumption expenditures of 
non-government households, the magnitude of this difference is smaller. Panel C reveals that annual 
total family consumption expenditures in government households are 48,754 RMB (around $7,330 in 
current dollars) which is much higher than 30,450 RMB (around $4,578 in current dollars), the 
associated total consumption expenditure in non-government families.  
Table 2 reveals that all government household expenditures are significantly higher than the non-
government household expenditures. In addition, the surveyed family's annual family income and the 
annual saving of the government system families are also significantly higher than the non-government 
families’ values. Thus, on average, the government's family expenditures and economic conditions are 
better than the non-government families. I directly control for these observable differences in 
economic conditions in the analysis, although the differences approach should render them 
inconsequential as confounding factors since identification is driven by the differences within 
household type over time across sets of goods. 
In addition to observable factors, another concern is the unobservable factors such as expenditure 
habits and behavioral trends. To check this, I draw Figure 2 which is the government and non-
government household annual expenditure patterns from 2010 to 2018. From Figure 2, we see that 
the government system families’ and the non-government system families’ total annual family 
expenditures have similar trends over the entire sample which reduces the concern that we are simply 
picking up differential income paths for these two groups. Further summary information household 
expenditure, and household income and savings disaggregated by survey wave are presented in 




1.4 Empirical approach 
1.4.1 Regression model 
The main issue in estimating the relationship between the effects of anti-corruption policy and 
households’ expenditures is that any expenditure changes by government system households might 
be correlated with age, education levels, or other unobserved factors. To solve this potential 
endogeneity problem, I use a difference-in-differences approach and compare across types of 
expenditure within households.  
Furthermore, President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign was unexpected for most economic 
agents and thus could not have been easily planned for. The 18th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China focused on economic conditions and political reform. President Xi Jinping then 
suddenly announced the aggressive anti-corruption campaign just 18 days after the 18th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, when he became the president.11  
Because President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign containing Eight Regulations of 
Austerity targets only government system employees, I contrast expenditure patterns of families with 
at least one government system employee to those that do not have. In theory, if they are effective, 
the anti-corruption campaign should impact the first group’s expenditure habits more than the 
second’s one. More importantly, it should largely be visible in the form of increased relative spending 
by government households on the types of goods and services they previously received freely as gifts 
but not on other goods and services. Following Orrenius and Zavodny (2009), I also conduct a 
falsification test which I use an alternative group as the treatment group-the private companies 
affiliated families as the treatment group to access the validity of the DID estimation later. 
The estimated anti-corruption effect on “affected” and “non-affected” expenditure in the 
difference-in-differences (DD) can be expressed as in Eq. (1): 
𝛽3 = (𝑌𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−2012
𝑇 − 𝑌𝑝𝑟𝑒−2012
𝑇 ) − (𝑌𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−2012
𝐶 −  𝑌𝑝𝑟𝑒−2012
𝐶 )    (1) 
Where Y estimates the households’ expenditures on the “affected” or “non-affected” expenditures. T 
refers to the treatment group which is the government affiliated households and C is the control group 
which is the non-government affiliated households. The term in the first parentheses estimates the 
difference in the expenditure of the government affiliated households (treatment group). The term in 
the second parentheses evaluates the difference in the expenditure of non-government affiliated 
 
11 The 18th National Congress discussed materials is from the Chinese Embassy in US and China.org.cn whose links are 
in the Appendix. 
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households (control group). The difference of these two differences signals out the impact of the anti-
corruption campaign on the expenditures of government affiliated households. 
Ultimately, to uncover the impact of the anti-corruption regulation I compare household 
expenditures across these two categories of goods, before and after 2014 which is the first year of 
CFPS dataset after 2012 and contrast these differences for both sets of families. So, the main method 
analyzing the anti-corruption campaign’s effect on households’ expenditures is following: 
 
𝑌ℎℎ,𝑝,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝑔𝑜𝑣ℎℎ + 𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡12𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑜𝑣ℎℎ ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡12𝑡 + 𝑋ℎℎ,𝑝,𝑡𝐵 + 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏𝑝 + 𝜖ℎℎ,𝑝,𝑡 (2) 
Where 𝑌ℎℎ,𝑡 is the measurement of household level, hh, “affected expenditure”, “non-affected 
expenditure”, or “surveyed family total expenditure” at different time. 𝑔𝑜𝑣ℎℎ is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if household, hh, is in the government affiliated household group, and 0 if household hh is 
in the non-government affiliated group. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡12𝑡  is a time dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
expenditure is observed after 2012, and 0 otherwise. Because President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
policy begun at the end of 2012, the policy effective time should start in 2014 which the information 
CFPS only has right after 2012. So, the time dummy variable 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡12 captures aggregate factors that 
affect both groups. 𝑔𝑜𝑣ℎℎ ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡12𝑡 is the interaction term of the treatment group dummy and the 
time dummy. The coefficient of this interaction term 𝛽3 estimates the difference-in-differences effect 
which is the effect of President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption.  
 𝑋ℎℎ,𝑝,𝑡 is a vector of household head demographic characteristics and household characteristics 
such as gender, age, education level, and households’ size. 𝑎𝑡 and 𝑏𝑝 are the year fixed effect and the 
provinces fixed effect which can control for other unobserved province and year specific 
heterogeneities. To control unobserved influence in different households, I also control the household 
level fixed effects. Because some household heads change in different survey years and that some 
households also change home location, I can include household fixed effects in addition to province 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. 𝛽1 captures the difference in spending between the government 
and non-government households over the sampling period. The coefficient, 𝛽2, captures the changes 
in average family expenditure for all households before and after the policy shock. 
When comparing results from equation (2) on affected and then on non-affected expenditures, 
we should expect to see affected expenditure changes by a larger margin only among the government 
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workers if the anti-corruption campaign is inducing different behavior or cutting down on illegal 
benefits.12  
 
1.4.2 Baseline results 
Table 3 presents the baseline results for affected expenditures in panel A and non-affected 
expenditures in panel B. Column (1) in panel A and panel B with no controls show that government 
households significantly spend more than the non-government households in both affected and non-
affected expenditure groups, 0.288 and 0.055. In panel A and Panel B, column (2) with one more time 
dummy variable representing anti-corruption policy shock denotes that both government and non-
government households spend more on affected and non-affected expenditures after President Xi 
Jinping’s anti-corruption policy shock, then column (3) and column (4) add the DID interaction term 
and all controls including family size, household head age, household age squared, household head 
gender, family annual income, family annually saving, household minority, province fixed effects and 
year fixed effects.  
The coefficients of interest are those on the interaction terms in columns (3) and (4) which are 
large and significantly positive in panel A and indistinguishable from zero (both in statistical 
significance and economic magnitude) in Panel B. These findings suggest that government household 
expenditures on affected commodities rose by 11.6 percentage points more than those for the non-
government households after the anti-corruption campaign. No similar increase is observed for non-
affected expenditure categories – namely, Column (4) of panel B indicates that changes in government 
household spending over the period are similar to those for non-government households across non-
affected expenditure group. In other words, President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign does 
influence government household expenditures in affected expenditure group and does not influence 
their expenditures in non-affected expenditure group. These results suggest that President Xi Jinping’s 
anti-corruption policy was effective in cutting affected expenditure categories and therefore reducing 
graft occurring in everyday life. 
 
1.4.3 Validity of the difference-in-differences method 
To further check the validity of the difference-in-differences regression specification, I used the 
following 4 methods to do further tests.  
 
12 I confirm the results from Eq. (2) with a triple differences model in Appendix Table A4. 
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First, I use a fake effectiveness year of anti-corruption and assume that the effectiveness time of 
anti-corruption is 2012 instead of the true effectiveness year 2014, which is the first year right after 
the anti-corruption campaign. We should note that the anti-corruption campaign was implemented at 
the end of 2012 and therefore 2012 was not the time after the anti-corruption campaign started. 
However, I then need to use the total expenditures because of lack of subcategories of expenditures 
information in CFPS of 2010.  All other regressors are the same as in Table 3 but setting the anti-
corruption effective year as 2012. If the control group is comparable and the difference-in-differences 
is valid, the coefficient of the interaction term should be indistinguishable from zero. The 
insignificantly negative coefficient estimate, -0.035, of the DID interaction term in the left panel of 
Table A5 implies the validity of DID.  
Second, as a placebo test, I run the same regression as in Table 3 but setting households only with 
private company employees as a treatment group and all the rest non-government employment 
households as the control group. The results are shown in the right panel of Table A5. The 
insignificant coefficients of interaction term mean that the anti-corruption campaign does not affect 
the expenditures of the private employment household group in both affected and non-affected 
expenditure groups. 
Third, I check if there is a different trend in the expenditures between the government affiliated 
households and the non-government affiliated households before the anti-corruption campaign. CFPS 
data set in 2010 is different from the data sets in other years, because CFPS in 2010 does not contain 
the information on subcategories of expenditures, which we used to classify affected and non-affected 
expenditure groups. Therefore, to test the common trend assumption I use the mean family annual 
total expenditures from 2010 to 2018 and present the results in Figure 4, which indicates parallel trends 
before the anti-corruption campaign and a significant expenditure jumps in government affiliated 
household after 2014. The presence of a parallel trend indicates the significant influence of the anti-
corruption campaign. 
Forth, I conduct a manipulation test. The anti-corruption campaign was not predictable, because 
President Xi Jinping implemented this aggressive anti-corruption campaign in 18 days after becoming 
president. The short time gap between the new presidency and the new policies may imply the 
randomness of anti-corruption. In Figure A1, I checked the percentage of households with at least 
one government employee as a fraction of the total households from 2010 to 2018. I used the 2010 
data set here, because the 2010 data set contains the government or non-government system 
employment information. Figure A1 indicates that after the anti-corruption campaign, which began in 
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December 2012, the rate of government households increased and reached a peak in 2016. This 
supports the randomness of the anti-corruption campaign.  
 
1.4.4 Robustness check 
In this section I examine the effect of other potentially confounding factors and whether the effect of 
the anti-corruption campaign is uniformly distributed across different levels of government affiliated 
households.  
The first potential concern is possible changes in overall economic conditions. Therefore, I 
checked China’s GDP, GDP growth rate, Chinese government revenue, and Chinese government 
annual final expenditures from 2010 to 2018 which are in Appendix Table A3. The results indicate all 
those indexes were increasing. This amplified Chinese government revenues and expenditures, 
increasing the potential pool of resources and opportunities for corruption for the Chinese 
government system workers. However, the basic regression results and all other robustness checks 
here show the opposite, a reduction in affected expenditures of households with government 
employees.  
Another concern is the influential consistency of the anti-corruption campaign which is whether 
it had the same effect on all levels of government household expenditures. Therefore, I repeat Eq. (2) 
by using a quintile regression classifying five different ascent expenditure groups whose results are 
presented in Table 4.  Because for government affiliated households, the answers to regular 
expenditure survey questions are more reliable than the answers to income survey questions, I use the 
expenditure of household as the classification standard to classify the ascent quintile groups. Therefore, 
according to the expenditure of households, I artificially classify affected expenditures into five ascent 
groups to do the DID analysis and did the same process for the non-affected expenditure. To check 
the consistence of affected and non-affected expenditures in different years, I draw the Figure A2 and 
Figure A3 indicating the very similar distributions of all households affected and non-affected 
expenditures in different years. In affected expenditures panel the DID coefficient is 1% significantly 
positive in the lowest twenty percentile expenditure group, 22.7%. Then the magnitude decreases to 
10.6% at 10% significance level. From column (3) to column (4) the associated growth difference 
between government and non-government households before and after this anti-corruption campaign 
becomes insignificant. While there is possibly a large effect among the richest households too, that 
may not be precisely estimated. The results suggest that the largest reduction in corrupt behavior may 
have actually occurred among the lowest level (poorest) government system households. These 
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households began to spend more of their own income on the affected group expenditures which were 
likely free or discounted for them before the anti-corruption campaign began. In middle income and 
possible in higher level expenditure groups, this trend may suggest that the anti-corruption effects 
through the reduced illegal cash income channel could become more important or the anti-corruption 
campaign may not affect the higher-level government households. 
In the non-affected panel, the coefficients of interaction term are insignificantly small negative 
numbers and do not change from column (1) to column (5). These results are consistent with those 
in Table 3 and suggest that the anti-corruption campaign does not affect the change in expenditures 
over the period on this group relative to non-governmental families, which is reassuring the causal 
interpretation of my findings.  
To check for more information on how the anti-corruption campaign affected different 
government household expenditures, I divide the sample into the urban and rural areas. Because 
higher-rank government organizations tend to cluster in urban areas and lower-rank government 
organizations locate in rural areas in China, the effectiveness of the anti-corruption campaign may 
differ between different government employees and households depending on their location. Table 5 
suggests, consistent with Table 4, that most of the reallocation likely occurred among lower level 
employees, this time in rural areas of the country.  
An interesting question is the extent to which having ties with the CCP can buffer against the 
possibility of prosecution. Consequently, this paper classifies government households on the basis of 
whether or not the government household members are also CCP members. Normally CCP members 
in the government system have higher-rank positions. In fact, even when people who are not CCP 
members are promoted into the management level, the government will encourage them to join in 
CCP. Table 6 compares the results for CCP and non-CCP member households. The estimates suggest 
that expenditures in the affected category increased only among government households without CCP 
members after the anti-corruption campaign. In CCP households, the anti-corruption program does 
not seem to have any effect on consumption expenditures. This result could mean that the anti-
corruption campaign does not influence higher level government households, or that those with 
stronger ties to the party were more likely to be insulated from prosecution and thus faced less 
incentive to change their behavior. Another potential possibility could also be that the households 
with government officials and CCP members were not corrupted or were much less corrupted since 
free-market reforms in 1978. According to the convicted top Chinese government officials in Figure 
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1, reports on other previous anti-corruption campaigns, the first explanation may make more sense 
(Deng, 2010). 
It has also been suggested that President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is just a political 
tool to purge his political enemies (Chen & Kung, 2019). To analyze this question, I categorize CFPS 
data set into two subgroups: President Xi’s political power base provinces group and provinces outside 
the powerbase. The promotion process of Chinese government political system is unique: before the 
president candidate becomes the President, this candidate needs to work in different provinces to get 
more experience and improve the capability. President Xi Jinping has administered Hebei (1982-1985), 
Fujian (1985-2002), Zhejiang (2002-2007), and Shanghai (2007), so I classify these four provinces as 
President Xi Jinping’s political powerbase. Hence, I run Eq. (2) based on President Xi Jinping’s 
powerbase. Then I repeat the same regression based on other rest provinces in Table 7. The results 
suggest that the anti-corruption campaign had far less impact, if any, in President Xi Jinping’s 
powerbase, but instead influenced behavior in other provinces of China.  
The first reason could be that in President Xi Jinping’s political power base provinces government 
employees are not afraid of the anti-corruption campaign, because they are loyalists. In contrast, the 
effect of the anti-corruption campaign increased government households’ expenditures on affected 
expenditure in other provinces. In non-affected expenditure group, both subgroups do not change a 
lot, lending credibility to the estimates. The second reason may be that because President Xi Jinping 
has been the leaders in those provinces or cities, those government officials obey President Xi Jinping’s 
order better than other places. Or when President Xi Jinping was the leader in his power base, he 
already implemented anti-corruption policy locally. In the future, I need more information to check 
this point. According to the information in Figure 1 and the report of newspapers, the first explanation 
could be more reliable (Deng, 2010; Campbell, 2018; Shih, 2018). 
I am also interested in the sources of increased expenditures in government affiliated households. 
I hypothesize that government affiliated households start using their legal incomes or savings to pay 
for the increased expenditures. Therefore, I now use annual household saving and household incomes 
as the dependent variables to run the same regression in Table 3. Next, I compare the change in 
savings and incomes between the two groups in Table 8. I find that savings in government households 
increased compared to non-government households after the anti-corruption campaign. However, I 
also find that income significantly decreases in government households compared to non-government 





The anti-corruption campaign of President Xi Jinping is one of the most important events in recent 
Chinese history and provides a good opportunity for a random experiment to analyze its effects. At 
the same time there are serious doubts over its effectiveness and whether or not it is a political move 
to root out rival factions within the communist party rather than an economic one. This paper tries 
to answer some of these questions and to provide clarity on how the anti-corruption campaign affected 
different kinds of expenditures and what kind of government related families are influenced more.  
To summarize, this paper examines President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign using a novel 
test based on expenditure patterns – classifying commodities into those susceptible and those not 
susceptible to corruption through the difference-in-differences method. Beside the basic DID 
regression results, I also tested this anti-corruption effects on expenditures in different levels of 
government families, different triple DID and different subcategories as robustness checks. 
The campaign appears to have forced some government households to pay more for products 
and services that they might have been receiving for free prior to the reform. Interestingly, these 
effects are not uniformly distributed. Higher level government households, those in the CCP and 
those residing in the traditional powerbase of the President, do not exhibit obvious effects from the 
anti-corruption campaign. Instead, the changes occur among lower-level government households. 
These results suggest that it is more reasonable to believe that the anti-corruption mainly affect lower-
level government households’ expenditures not the higher level and his own closer relationship 
government workers. Future research may estimate the benefits of reduced corruption as well as 





















Notes: the trend of high-level governors who are convicted into the jail or in house of detention 
during the investigating process in that specific year which is from 2010 to 2018. The y-axis shows the 
number of those convicted high level governors.  
 



















Figure 1. 2: Surveyed total family expenditure trend 
 
Notes: CPFS surveyed family annually total expenditure ranging 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018.  
 
















Figure 1. 3: Total family income trend from 2010 to 2018 
 
 
Notes: CPFS surveyed total family total income ranging 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018.  
 
















Figure 1. 4: Total family expenditure common trend from 2010 to 2018 
 
 
Notes: CPFS surveyed family annually total expenditure ranging 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018.  
 















Table 1.1: Pooled average demographic summary statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Full Government Non-Government  Difference 
Job Characteristics 
Public servant 0.02 0.11 0 0.11 
SOE 0.04 0.25 0 0.25 
Institution 0.03 0.17 0 0.17 
Other 0.91 0.46 1 -0.54*** 
Education Levels 
< Primary 0.24 0.10 0.27 -0.17*** 
Primary 0.21 0.11 0.23 -0.12*** 
Middle school 0.28 0.25 0.28 -0.04*** 
High school 0.14 0.23 0.13 0.10*** 
Junior college 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.10*** 
College 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.11*** 
Graduate 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01*** 
Basic Information 
Minority 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00*** 
Urban 0.49 0.71 0.45 0.26*** 
Hukou 0.29 0.57 0.23 0.36*** 
Female 0.50 0.50 0.50 -0.00*** 
Family Size 3.37 3.52 3.33 0.18*** 
 (1.65) (1.53) (1.67) (0.03) 
Adult Size 2.53 2.80 2.47 0.35*** 
 (1.22) (1.25) (1.20) (0.02) 
Age 46.77 42.40 47.67 -5.42*** 
 (16.96) (14.49) (17.29) (0.26) 
Regional Characteristics 
East 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.018 
Middle 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.03*** 
West 0.27 0.24 0.28 -0.04*** 
N 54568 9228 45340   
Notes: Pooled household level sample spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. Total number of 
observations is 54,568 for all years, 45,340 for the non-government household, and 9,228 for the 
government household. In Job Characteristics panel, public servant is government administer system 
workers. SOE means State Owned Enterprise. Institution is the government system research 
organizations, education, and social welfare organizations. < Primary means education experience is 
less than primary school. Primary infers primary school education. Middle school and high school imply 
the similar education experience in U.S. Junior college is the three years college or community 
university. Graduate means the master or PhD level education. Minority means minority rate among 
all households. Urban means the urban living household rate. Hukou means the urban household 
resident rate. Family size is the total number of family members. Adult size is the total number of adults 
in a household. Age is the household average age. East, Middle, and West are the household living areas 
in China. The difference column is the t-test for the difference between government and non-





Table 1.2: Summary information on consumptions 
A: Pooled family affected consumptions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
  Full Government 
Non-




Expenditure 11,720 20,452 9,943 10,508.7***  
Eating out 2,670 4,700 2,257 2,442.9*** 0.655*** 
Car 3,499 6,052 2,980 3072.1*** 1.0645*** 
Other Transportation 893 1,234 824 410.4*** 0.431*** 
Public Transportation 2,001 3,036 1,791 1,245.8*** 0.375*** 
Travel Expenditure 902 2,096 660 1,436.1*** 0.745*** 
Entertainment 189 393 147 245.7*** 0.757*** 
Durable Goods 1,565 2,941 1,285 1,655.7*** 0.496*** 
B: Pooled family non-affected consumptions 
Non-affected 
Consumption 
Expenditure 12,781 16,857 11,951 4,906.1***  
Health 277 444 243 201.5*** 0.654*** 
Medical 4,209 4,217 4,208 8.633 0.240*** 
Education 3,202 4,610 2,916 1,694.2*** 0.329*** 
Communication 1,740 2,395 1,607 788.4*** 0.278*** 
Cloth 2,138 3,383 1,884 1,498.4*** 0.323*** 
Necessary 803 1,045 754 290.7*** 0.286*** 
Cosmetic 412 764 340 424.2*** 0.654*** 
C: Pooled Family Surveyed Total Values 
Total Expenditure 33,545 48,754 30,450 1,8304.3***  
Income 44,375 68,198 39,527 2,8671.2***  
Saving 31,835 57,038 26,705 3,0332.3***  
N 54,568 9,228 45,340     
Notes: Pooled sample spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. All values are deflated to 2010 RMB prices by 
using 2010 CPI. Eating out means going to restaurant. Car is the car expenditure including mortgage. Other 
transportation infers other vehicle substitution expenditure instead of car expenditure. Public transportation 
is another substitution expenditure of car. Travel is the annually travelling expenditures which can usually 
spend bribes. Entertainment is the expenditures on recreation such as movie, and Karaoke. The Affected 
consumption expenditure is the summation of eating out, car, other transportation, public transportation, 
travel expenditure, and entertainment. Health is the spending on fitness or nutrition complements. Medical 
means the all-household expenditures on illness cure. Education is all household education expenditure not 
only for kids. Communication expenditure includes all postage and phone call. Necessary goods 
consumption is the daily expenditure excluding all above consumptions. Durable goods purchase infers the 
big electric furniture, such as TV and refrigerator. Cosmetic is the household spending on "face", like the 
face mask. Total number of observations is 54,568 for years sample, 45,340 for the non-government 
household, and 9,228 for the government household. The difference column is the t-test for the difference 


















Table 1.3: Baseline results 
A: Affected Family Expenditure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government 0.288*** 0.269*** 0.164*** 0.041 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.043) (0.042) 
Policy Shock Year  0.336*** 0.314*** 0.423*** 
  (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) 
Gov * Policy   0.129*** 0.116*** 
   (0.043) (0.042)      
 
Controls No No No Yes 
Province FE No No No Yes 
HH FE Yes Yes Yes Yes      
 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.385 0.385 0.429 
N 47,965 47,965 47,965 45,893 
B: Non-Affected Family Expenditure 
Government 0.055*** 0.039*** 0.038 -0.027 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.025) (0.024) 
Policy Shock Year  0.290*** 0.290*** 0.335*** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
Gov*Policy   0.001 0.020 
   (0.025) (0.024)     
Controls No No No Yes 
Province FE No No No Yes 
HH FE Yes Yes Yes Yes      
 
Adjusted R2 0.398 0.416 0.416 0.459 
N 47,965 47,965 47,965 45,893 
Notes: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. 
All Standard errors in parentheses. Government is a group dummy variable; 
1 means government group and 0 means control group. Policy Shock Year 
is a time dummy variable, 0 means before anti-corruption, 1 means after 
anti-corruption. Gov*Policy is the interaction term between government 
dummy and time dummy. Controls include household head age, gender, 
family size, family annually income, family annually saving living place, and 
educational affirming indicators. Province FE is all different province ID 












Table 1.4: Quintile groups consumptions based on expenditure 
Affected expenditure 
  0-20% 21%-40% 41%-60% 61%-80% 81%-100% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Government 0.070 0.168*** 0.186*** 0.196*** 0.043 
 (0.066) (0.053) (0.046) (0.042) (0.184) 
 Policy Shock Year 0.541*** 0.569*** 0.474*** 0.318*** 0.323*** 
 (0.035) (0.028) (0.024) (0.022) (0.097) 
Gov*Policy 0.227*** 0.106* 0.020 -0.036 0.193 
 (0.074) (0.059) (0.051) (0.047) (0.206) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HH FE No No No No No 
 
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.111 0.104 0.088 0.100 
N 39,383 39,383 39,383 39,383 39,383 
Non-affected expenditure 
Government 0.138*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.107*** 0.304*** 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.106) 
 Policy Shock Year 0.316*** 0.293*** 0.276*** 0.224*** 0.427*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.059) 
Gov*Policy -0.013 -0.008 -0.012 -0.013 -0.190 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.119) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HH FE No No No No No 
 
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.143 0.116 0.087 0.219 
N 45,896 45,896 45,896 45,896 45,896 
Notes: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. All Standard errors 
in parentheses. For all variable’s definitions including all kinds of fixed effects refer to Table 3. In 
this quantile regression, I dropped top 5% income group and top 10% affected expenditure group 
for affected regression. I did not drop any observation in non-affected expenditures regression. 

























































  Urban hukou Rural hukou 
 Affected Non-Affected Affected Non-Affected 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government 0.111* 0.012 -0.028 -0.053 
 (0.064) (0.036) (0.065) (0.038) 
 Policy Shock Year 0.513*** 0.353*** 0.390*** 0.333*** 
 (0.044) (0.025) (0.025) (0.014) 
Gov * Policy 0.076 -0.009 0.156** 0.025 
 (0.062) (0.035) (0.069) (0.040) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HH FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Adjustment R2 0.488 0.462 0.380 0.441 
N 13,622 13,622 32,271 32,271 
Notes: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. All 
Standard errors in parentheses. For all variable’s definitions including all kinds 
of fixed effects refer to Table 3. * p<0.10. **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 1.6: CCP & government expenditure results 
  CCP and government HH Non-CCP and government HH 
  Affected  Non-affected Affected  Non-affected 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government 0.194*** 0.035 -0.039 -0.052* 
 (0.070) (0.041) (0.052) (0.030) 
Policy Shock Year 0.412*** 0.336*** 0.423*** 0.339*** 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.021) (0.012) 
Gov * Policy 0.013 0.018 0.174*** 0.024 
 (0.065) (0.038) (0.053) (0.031) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HH FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Adjusted R2 0.427 0.458 0.416 0.452 
N 40,598 40,598 42,873 42,873 
Notes: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. All Standard errors in 
parentheses. For all variable’s definitions including all kinds of fixed effects refer to Table 3. * 


























Table 1.7: Powerbase check 
  Powerbase provinces Other provinces 
  Affected Non-affected Affected Non-affected 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government 0.160 -0.117 0.023 -0.005 
 (0.131) (0.078) (0.048) (0.027) 
Policy Shock 
Year 0.566*** 0.288*** 0.401*** 0.326*** 
 (0.075) (0.045) (0.022) (0.013) 
Gov*Policy -0.079 0.113 0.131*** -0.008 
 (0.132) (0.078) (0.047) (0.027) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HH FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Adjusted R2 0.407 0.409 0.389 0.441 
N 4,517 4,517 39,220 39,220 
Notes: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. All Standard errors in parentheses. For 
all variable’s definitions including all kinds of fixed effects refer to Table 3. In this regression, I dropped top 5% 



























Table 1.8: Increased expenditure channels 
  Saving Income 
  (1) (2) 
Government -0.536*** 1.056*** 
 (0.133) (0.068) 
Policy Shock Year -1.258*** 1.235*** 
 (0.065) (0.033) 
Gov * Policy 0.956*** -0.939*** 
 (0.132) (0.068) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes 
HH FE Yes Yes 
   
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.229 
N 45,893 45,893 
Note: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, 
and 2018. These two regressions are same as the regression in 
Table 3. The dependent variables are Family Annually Saving or 
Income. All Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include 
household head age and age square, gender, family size, family 
annually income (for saving regression only), family annually 
saving (for income regression only), living place, and education 
indicators. Province FE is all different province ID fixed effect. 





























1.A.1 Data cleaning method: 
 
Because CFPS has three separate data set: adult data set, family data set, and children data set; I 
merged the adult data set and family data set by the same family ID. The family data set contains the 
annual family total income, annual family total expenditures, and other family expenditures, e.g., 
outside meal expenditure, car expenditure, and entertainment expenditure. The adult data set has all 
individual demographic information such as job characteristics, age, gender, ethnicity, education, et al. 
Therefore, this paper merges the family level data set and adult level data set by the same family ID.  
 
1.A.2 Triple difference-in-differences model: 
 
In addition to observing the anti-corruption effects on affected and non-affected expenditures, 
some may also be curious about the comparison between affected and non-affected expenditures. 
Thus, I ran the following triple difference-in-differences regression and quintile triple difference-in-
differences regressions. The results are in Table A4. 
𝑌ℎℎ,𝑝,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝑔𝑜𝑣ℎℎ + 𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡12𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑ℎℎ + 𝛽4𝑔𝑜𝑣ℎℎ ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡12𝑡 + +𝛽5𝑔𝑜𝑣ℎℎ ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑ℎℎ +
𝛽6𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑ℎℎ ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡12ℎℎ + +𝛽7𝑔𝑜𝑣ℎℎ ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑ℎℎ ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡12ℎℎ + 𝑋ℎℎ,𝑝,𝑡𝐵 + 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏𝑝 + 𝜖ℎℎ,𝑝,𝑡 (A1) 
𝑌ℎℎ,𝑝,𝑡  includes households affected and non-affected expenditures. 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑ℎℎ is the dummy index for 
affected and non-affected expenditures. 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑ℎℎ = 1  means the affected expenditure and 
𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑ℎℎ = 0 means the non-affected expenditure. All other variable definitions are the same as in 
Table 3. Theoretical, the coefficient of the triple interaction, 𝛽7, should capture the specific portion of 
affected expenditure undertaken by the government households after the anti-corruption campaign. 
The triple difference-in-differences coefficient indicates that after the anti-corruption campaign 
government household spending on the affected expenditure increases more than the non-
government household spending growth, consistent with the set of difference-in-differences 
contained in the text. 
 
1.A.3 Chinese government eight regulations of austerity 
 
The eight-point rules, issued by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in December 2012, 
aim to reduce bureaucracy, extravagance and undesirable work practices of Party members. With 
30 
 
clauses focusing on various forms of corruption and unauthorized use of government cars, the rules 
have played a significant role in the country's anticorruption campaign. 
1. Leaders must carry out in-depth inspections at the grassroots level so that they remain in contact 
with the people and understand the issues affecting society. 
They must cut extravagance and do away with welcome banners, red carpets, floral arrangements and 
grand receptions for official visits. 
2. Meetings and major events should be strictly regulated and simplified. Political Bureau members 
are not allowed to attend opening ceremonies, celebrations or seminars, unless they get approval from 
the CPC Central Committee. Official meetings should be economical and efficient, with no 
inconsequential or prolonged talk. 
3. The number of official documents should be reduced to only those necessary. 
4. Officials' visits abroad should be arranged only when necessary for foreign affairs, with smaller 
accompanying delegations. 
On most occasions, there is no need for a reception by Chinese expatriates, institutions or students at 
the airport. 
5. There should be fewer traffic controls when leaders travel by car to avoid unnecessary 
inconvenience to the public. 
6. The media should consider the need, news value, and social impact of reporting on members of the 
Political Bureau, their work and their activities — the amount of time spent on such news items should 
be reduced and reports should be minimized in scope. 
7. Leaders should not publish anything by themselves or issue any congratulatory letters in their own 
name unless an arrangement with the central authorities has been made. 
8. Leaders must practice diligence and thrift, and strictly follow the relevant regulations on 
accommodation and cars. 
31 
 
Figure 1.A. 1: Xi’s anti-corruption randomness check 
 
 
Notes: Government system family rate equals the number of government system families divided by 
total number of families. 
 












Figure 1.A. 2: Affected expenditure comparison in different years 
 
 
Notes: These above graphs are comparing the quantiles of affected expenditure in one year with 
affected expenditure in the other year. 
 











Figure 1.A. 3: non-affected expenditure comparison in different years 
 
 
Notes: These above graphs are comparing the quantiles of non-affected expenditure in one year with 
non-affected expenditure in the other year. 
 




















Table 1.A. 1: Separate demographic summary statistics by year 
 Government People Non-Government People 
Year 2012 2014 2016 2018 2012 2014 2016 2018 
Job Characteristics 
Public servant 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.12 0 0 0 0 
SOE 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.29 0 0 0 0 
Institutions 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0 0 0 0 
Other jobs 0.52 0.49 0.45 0.41 1 1 1 1 
Education Levels 
< Primary 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.25 
Primary 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 
Middle school 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.30 
High school 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 
Junior college 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
College 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Graduate 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Basic Information 
Family Size 3.45 3.83 3.39 3.62 3.27 3.68 3.17 3.51 
 (1.44) (1.58) (1.57) (1.74) (1.59) (1.80) (1.63) (1.86) 
Adult Size 2.96 2.96 2.70 2.54 2.65 2.57 2.29 2.12 
 (1.27) (1.30) (1.26) (1.20) (1.26) (1.25) (1.16) (1.08) 
Age 41.75 42.99 42.85 43.18 46.80 47.57 47.78 48.34 
 (14.37) (14.95) (14.73) (14.78) (17.17) (17.72) (17.38) (17.27) 
Minority 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Urban 0.68 0.67 0.73 0.74 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.47 
Hukou 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 
Female 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Regional Characteristics 
East 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.44 
Middle 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 
West 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 
N 2015 2382 2520 2311 11144 11209 11544 11443 
Notes: Results calculated using the CFPS sample from 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 in different 
groups, government system workers and non-government system people. Standard deviation in 
parentheses are included where informative. This summary table is based on head of household. 
The left panel indicates the government group information based on government observations. 
The right panel is the nongovernment group information based on nongovernment observations. 
All education levels are the rate measurement in different years. Regional Characteristics are the 
















Table 1.A. 2:  Separate years effected family consumptions 
 Government Non-government 
  2012 2014 2016 2018 2012 2014 2016 2018 
Effected Consumptions 20,607 16,880 23,366 20,819 9,489 7,738 10,852 11,627 
Eating out 7,738 3,340 3,815 4,418 3,185 1,530 1,978 2,347 
Car 6,233 5,458 6,454 6,068 3,001 2,174 2,914 3,815 
Other Transportation 961 1,152 1,353 1,428 664 727 881 1,016 
Public Transportation 2,421 2,880 3,164 3,596 1,376 1,681 1,890 2,202 
Travel Expenditure 1,509 1,738 2,281 2,774 394 521 753 960 
Entertainment 452 272 388 471 140 105 144 199 
Durable Goods 1,293 2,040 5,912 2,065 729 1,001 2,292 1,088 
Separate Years Non-Effected Family Consumptions 
 Government Non-government 
Nonaffected 
Consumptions 13,825 15,790 18,081 19,266 9,646 11,103 12,994 13,974 
Health 274 369 495 615 140 196 293 336 
Medical 3,078 4,087 4,908 4,589 3,525 3,888 4,736 4,654 
Education 4,041 4,143 4,680 5,510 2,461 2,662 3,027 3,494 
Communication 2,160 2,365 2,517 2,500 1,311 1,543 1,746 1,818 
Cloth 2,972 3,156 3,497 3,850 1,509 1,784 1,968 2,263 
Necessary 797 972 1,186 1,180 559 710 832 907 
Cosmetic 502 700 798 1,022 140 320 391 503 
Separate Years Family Surveyed Values 
 Government Non-government 
HH total 
Expenditure 49,828 43,466 50,883 50,948 31,319 28,239 30,466 31,754 
Family Income 61,116 62,328 70,731 77,660 29,038 37,942 44,652 46,123 
Saving 39,215 46,639 63,808 75,914 20,353 20,158 30,398 35,580 
N 2,015 2,382 2,520 2,311 11,144 11,209 11,544 11,443 
Note: Results are calculated by using CFPS samples from 2012, 2014 and 2016. Estimates are survey weighted. Standard 
deviations in parentheses are included where informative. Total number of observations is 54,825 for the full sample, 
50,663 for the non-government group, and 3,457 for the government group. We calculated this summary table based 
one individual level. We account the family is government household if there are at least one government system 
workers. Government workers and other entities are calculated separately. All the variables definitions refer to Table 2. 















































Table 1.A. 3: Economic condition in China 
Year RGDP/CAP GDP growth rate Revenue Expenditure 
2010 4550 10.636 11.231 12.846 
2011 5323 9.551 11.239 13.217 
2012 5832 7.860 11.139 13.475 
2013 6343 7.769 10.956 13.589 
2014 6754 7.300 15.874 13.375 
2015 6990 6.905 16.110 14.036 
2016 6892 6.737 15.764 14.386 
2017 7355 6.757  14.522 
2018 8038 6.567   14.676 
Notes: RGDP/CAP means GDP per capital based on 2010 US dollars 
values. Revenue is Chinese government annual revenue percentage of GDP 
excluding grant. Expenditure is the government annual final expenditure 














Table 1.A. 4: Triple DID results 
  Basic DID Quintile regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Government -0.130*** 0.090* 0.043 0.043 0.040 0.267* 
 (0.032) (0.046) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.149) 
Policy Shock 
Year 0.295*** 0.332*** 0.295*** 0.269*** 0.202*** 0.443*** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.075) 
Affected -1.091*** -1.607*** -1.242*** -0.908*** -0.563*** -2.299*** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.083) 
Gov*Policy 0.004 -0.039 -0.031 -0.041 -0.040 -0.132 
 (0.034) (0.052) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.169) 
Gov*Affected 0.233*** 0.108 0.296*** 0.321*** 0.320*** -0.262 
 (0.039) (0.066) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055) (0.212) 
Policy*Affected 0.076*** 0.132*** 0.215*** 0.161*** 0.054** -0.232** 
 (0.017) (0.030) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.096) 
Gov*Policy*Aff
ected 0.127*** 0.363*** 0.147** 0.048 -0.029 0.389 
 (0.044) (0.075) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.242) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HH FE No No No No No No 
Adjusted/ 
Pseudo R2 0.449 0.243 0.188 0.142 0.094 0.277 
N 83,121 83,121 83,121 83,121 83,121 83,121 
Notes: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. All Standard errors in 
parentheses. For all variable’s definitions refer to Table 4. The dependent variables, expenditure, 
includes affected and non-affected consumption expenditures in one column. Gov*affected is the 
interaction term between the treatment index and affected consumption index. Policy*Affected is 
the interaction term between the anti-corruption campaign index and the affected consumption 
index dummy. Gov*Policy*Affected is the triple interaction term. I dropped the top 5% family 
income households in the basic regression panel. In the quantile regression panel, I dropped another 
top 5% consumption expenditure group. The reason of these drops is that in the entire distribution 




























Table 1.A. 5: Specification test 
  Time Specification Test Alternative treatment control group 
  Surveyed total  Affected  Non-affected 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Government 0.018 0.022 0.035 
 (0.074) (0.207) (0.121) 
Policy Shock Year -0.402*** 0.378*** 0.346*** 
 (0.033) (0.023) (0.014) 
Gov*Policy -0.035 0.117 -0.054 
 (0.072) (0.209) (0.122) 
 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
Adjusted R2 0.412 0.671 0.684 
N 66234 37595 37595 
Notes: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. All Standard errors 
in parentheses. For all variable’s definitions including all kinds of fixed effects refer to Table 4. * 

























Table 1.A. 6: All expenditure categories results 
Effected consumption categories 






Transportation Tourism Entertainment 
Durable 
goods 
Government 0.042 -0.324*** -0.675*** -0.037 -0.034 -0.233*** -0.283*** -0.336*** 
 (0.042) (0.103) (0.082) (0.099) (0.081) (0.076) (0.066) (0.104) 
 Policy Shock Year 0.425*** 1.195*** 1.253*** 0.464*** 0.467*** 0.877*** 0.858*** 0.198*** 
 (0.021) (0.049) (0.039) (0.047) (0.038) (0.036) (0.031) (0.049) 
Gov*Policy 0.116*** 0.724*** 1.124*** 0.203** 0.196** 0.622*** 0.693*** 0.598*** 
 (0.042) (0.103) (0.082) (0.099) (0.081) (0.076) (0.066) (0.104) 
Urban 0.325*** 1.176*** 0.336*** 0.082 0.108* 0.558*** 0.591*** 0.070 
 (0.030) (0.073) (0.058) (0.070) (0.057) (0.053) (0.047) (0.073) 
Family Size 0.066*** -0.108*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.233*** -0.011 0.024*** 0.082*** 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) 
Age -0.003 -0.031*** 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.031*** 0.014*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Female 0.020 0.092** 0.001 0.041 0.033 -0.021 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.016) (0.037) (0.030) (0.036) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.038) 
Total Family Income 0.040*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.114*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.067*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Family Saving 0.026*** 0.089*** 0.028*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Adjusted R2 0.429 0.336 0.294 0.188 0.385 0.395 0.384 0.090 
N 45,909 51,661 51,661 51,661 51,661 51,661 51,661 51,661 
Note: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. All Standard errors in parentheses. For all 
variable’s definitions including all kinds of fixed effects refer to Table 3. The dependent variables are different subcategories 











Table 1.A. 7: non-affected consumption categories 
  Nonaffected Health Medical Education Communication Cloth 
Daily 
necessities Cosmetic 
Government -0.027 0.060 -0.000 -0.164 0.101** 0.106** 0.001 0.193** 
 (0.024) (0.052) (0.000) (0.118) (0.046) (0.048) (0.033) (0.086) 
 Policy 
Shock Year 0.335*** 0.150*** 0.000 0.966*** 1.730*** 0.478*** -1.394*** 5.269*** 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.000) (0.058) (0.022) (0.024) (0.016) (0.042) 
Gov*Policy 0.020 0.016 0.000* 0.064 -0.058 -0.062 -0.007 0.037 
 (0.024) (0.052) (0.000) (0.117) (0.045) (0.048) (0.033) (0.086) 
Urban 0.102*** 0.148*** 0.000*** 0.137* 0.164*** 0.207*** 0.098*** 0.568*** 
 (0.017) (0.037) (0.000) (0.083) (0.032) (0.034) (0.024) (0.061) 
Family Size 0.131*** 0.009 0.000*** 0.706*** 0.172*** 0.092*** 0.066*** 0.105*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) 
Age -0.002 0.005 0.000* 0.047*** 0.011*** 0.005 -0.001 -0.008 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Female -0.017* -0.023 0.000*** 0.009 -0.006 -0.034* -0.020* -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.000) (0.043) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.032) 
Total 
Family 
Income 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.000*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.074*** 0.027*** 0.079*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
Family 
Saving 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.000*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.034*** 0.009*** 0.062*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Adjusted R2 0.459 0.268 0.228 0.466 0.478 0.388 0.398 0.537 
N 51429 51670 51670 51670 51670 51670 51670 51670 
Notes: The data set in the regression spanning 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. All Standard errors in parentheses. For all variable’s 
definitions including all kinds of fixed effects refer to Table 3. For all variable’s definitions including all kinds of fixed effects refer 




Chapter 2: The Chinese Communist Party and Religious Identification in 
China: An Empirical Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
Even though the Chinese government is tolerant of five official religions for non-CCP individuals, the 
members in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) must adhere to militant atheism. Membership in the 
CCP brings large material benefits for those who are able to join.13 CCP members maintain an elevated 
position in society, a stable source of income, as well as subsidies and influence (Xu et al. 2017). The 
existence of these benefits to CCP members imply a large material cost to overt religious affiliation 
and practice in China.  
This paper uses a difference in difference approach to study the extent to which the CCP’s policies 
regarding religion may influence religious identification over an individual’s life cycle in China. To do 
so, I contrast the changes in religious affiliation before and after retirement for CCP members in 
comparison to those before and after retirement of non-CCP individuals. In theory, individuals who 
were in the CCP but religious may have chosen to hide their religious beliefs while working in order 
not to lose out on party benefits. If this is the case, then we would expect to observe some degree of 
increase in religious identification or practice among the newly retired CCP members. I find no 
evidence of any discontinuous jump in religious membership after retirement. Instead, religiosity 
trends up among non CCP individuals and remains flat among CCP members over the life cycle, with 
no changes in trend around retirement. 
These results suggest that either: (1) assortative matching drives individuals into the CCP who are 
initially non-religious and then remain so, or (2) some degree of lingering benefits associated with CCP 
membership even after employment ends are large enough to disincentivize religious uptake. 
This paper makes multiple contributions to the literature on how government affects individuals’ 
religious behaviors. This is the first paper to attempt to quantify how the Chinese government uses a 
strategy of economic incentives to influence religious belief. Even though many others comment 
qualitatively on how the Chinese Communist Party controls religious beliefs; no paper systematically 
discusses how the Chinese government controls or influences them through economic benefits 
(Office of International Religious Freedom, 2019). The second contribution is a new identification 
method through the changes of religious belief in the CCP group before and after the retirement 
because of the religious belief regulations in Constitution of the Communist Party of China. 
 




2.2 Background on religious belief 
Previous research has focused on religion as a commercial commodity by using supply and demand 
principles (Iannaccone, Finke, & Stark, 1997). Recently other researchers also begun to focus on 
economics role in religion (Iyer, 2016). They think that religious belief is a public goods market and 
the econometrics methods should be used for identification. Different characteristics of places and 
people can influence same religion into different directions, such as Christian in West Europe, East 
Europe, and America (Brenner, 2016). In addition to research on how the Communist party affects 
religious beliefs, some papers have focused on the religious belief changes between East Germany 
ruled by the Soviet Union and West Germany ruled by U.S before and after collapse of Soviet Union. 
(Hardy, Skirbekk, & Stonawski, 2019; Konrad, 2015). They find that the number of people stating a 
religious belief in East Germany is much smaller than the West Germany. The number of religious 
youths in East Germany is also significantly smaller than the number of religious believers in West 
Germany. Even after the collapse of Soviet Union these young people’s religious belief does not 
increase. They conclude that communist party can reduce people’s preference for religious beliefs and 
that this effect can persist. For religion development in China, researchers have focused on how 
economics market reform influences the Chinese religious affiliation (Xu et al. 2017). Miller (2000) 
compared the effects of religious belief on people’s behaviors in different societies. Religion can only 
influence individual’s behaviors in Asia but affect entire society behaviors in Western world. This 
paper researched how a society policy affected people’s religious behaviors in China. 
During the 1950s, the CCP selected a number of cooperative religious leaders to build related 
institutional organizations, such as the Chinese Buddhist Association, the Chinese Islamist Association, 
the Chinese Daoist Association, and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Committee. These were essentially 
efforts to better monitor and control religious activity. During the Cultural Revolution, many 
traditional temples and religious venues were destroyed (Lopez & Donald, 1996). After the death of 
Chairman Mao in 1976, they loosened the restrictions on regulations due to the policy on “Open Gate” 
policy. Since 1982, the Chinese government officially defines only five legal religions in the country -
- which are Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism, but no other.14  
 
14 This was formalized in the edict, “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Affairs during the Socialist Period 
of Our Country,” also known as “Document No.19” (Yang 2004). 
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Religious affiliation in China has increased significantly in past 30 years (World Values Survey, 
2007). According to the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), the primary data set in this paper, the 
people of religious believers in China has increased 120% from 2005 to 2015. However, the religious 
belief rate in China is still much lower than other countries (Xu et al., 2017). This comparatively lower 
religiosity rate probably reflects, among other factors, the effects of long-term religious regulations on 
people’s minds and behaviors (Hardy et al., 2019).  
 The Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s Annual Report in 2017 argued that 
Chinese citizens have religious freedom. However, Document No.19 regulates that only non-CCP 
individuals have religious freedom. CCP members are not allowed to join any religious group by the 
Constitution of the Communist Party of China. The Constitution of the CCP regulates that any 
member of CCP can only believe in Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiao-ping 
Theory (the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 1949). They should use these theories to 
guide their work and life. Beside the regulation requirement, the United Front Work is responsible for 
the management of religions and for checking CCP members’ religious conditions and spirit or CCP 
members’ loyalty.15 
 
2.3 Data description 
The main source of data for this paper is the Chinese General Social Survey, a cross sectional survey 
conducted in 2003, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015 which was undertaken in 30 out of 
36 provinces in China. It contains the stated religious affiliation of individuals as well as different 
measures of religiosity and demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, income, and 
expenditure. A key advantage of this data set is that religious belief and religiosity are rarely collected 
in China. For example, it contains survey question “How often do you go to the religious places?” and 
“How much do you donate to this religious group?” 16  However, because of lacking religious 
information in 2003, I did not use the information in 2003. 
Table 1 summarizes the basic demographic information for CCP and non-CCP member 
individuals. Many elements such as urbanization and cultural pluralism can affect religious affiliation 
(Casanova 2006; Gorski 2003). The CCP members percentage in this data set is 10.9. In the 
Employment panel, the percentage of CCP members who work in the government system, column 
 
15 United Front Work is an agency of the Communist Party that manages relations with various important and influential 
elite individuals and organizations inside and outside China. 
16 We do not analyze religious belief by using donation information owing many missing values. 
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(2), is significantly higher than the percentage of non-CCP individuals who worked in government 
system, column (3). This implies that, as expected, CCP members are tied with government system 
more than the non-CCP individuals. On average government jobs mean more materials benefits, 
stable income, and anecdotally, an esteemed reputation. The education level of non-CCP members’ is 
significantly lower than the education level of CCP members. Education is one important element 
which affects people’s religiosity, and is usually negatively correlated with it (Nord, 2014). Education 
also leads to more secularization in society (Liang & Dong, 2019). To understand more on how 
education affects religious belief in this paper, I draw Figure A1 in Appendix to indicate that as 
education levels increase, the religiosity decreases. The two parallel lines in Figure A1 also demonstrate 
that the effect of education on religious belief is estimated to be the same for both CCP and non-CCP 
groups.  
In China there are 56 government recognized ethnicities with different and unique culture and 
religious characteristics. For simplicity I create an indicator for being from the majority population, 
Han. It is obvious that the other 55 ethnicities in the CCP comprise is less than that in non-CCP 
individuals, around 1.6%. In China, there are better social services such as higher quality schools and 
medical systems in urban areas. Table 1 shows that 76.8% of CCP members live in urban areas, which 
is much higher than that of non-CCP individuals.17 Some papers argue that older people or women 
who are not the main labor sources have more time to participate the religious events, especially the 
old people concerning their health problems (McCleary & Barro, 2006). The female in CCP group. 
26.6% of the sample of CCP members is female, which is significantly lower than that of 54.8% for 
non-CCP members workers. CCP members are relative older than non-CCP individuals on average. 
Family size is also smaller among CCP members. The distribution of CCP members and non-CCP 
individuals is similar in different regions, East, Middle and West.18  
Religious information is summarized in Table 2. Overall, 11.2% of individuals report a religious 
belief. Despite being forbidden, 6.1% appear to answer that they are religious believers in this survey, 
which is much smaller than 11.8% religious’ believers in non-CCP group. 
In the Panel B of Table 2, I classify the religiosity into five groups according to the frequency of 
religious activities. The number of non-religious activities in CCP group is much more than that of 
 
17 It is better for us to use place of residence to classify the urban or rural places than using the Chinese hukou system, 
because people could be influenced by the place of residence. 
18 The separate years summary in Table A1-1 and Table A1-2 in the appendix also indicate the similar results e.g., higher 
urban rate, lower minority rate, and older age in the CCP system. The number of surveyed observations and the related 
proportion of CCP members is different in different years. 
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people in non-CCP group. Oppositely, all other kinds of religious activities participation in CCP group 
is much less than the same religious activities in non-CCP group.  
CGSS also supports information on different religious affiliations: Buddhism, Daoism, Folk 
Religion, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism and Others including Hindu, Orthodox, Judaism and 
other Chinese local Gods.19 The “Religious classes panel” indicates the Buddhism is the most popular 
religion in China, which is 0.054 overall. The Buddhism belief is 0.028 in CCP group and 0.058 in 
non-CCP group. In other religions, more people in non-CCP group have religious belief than the 
people in CCP group. 
Because governments formally recognize only a few religions and penalizes others, religious 
diversity is low in China (Iannaccone, Finke, & Stark, 1997; Stepan, 2000; Froese & Pfaff, 2005). To 
examine this issue, we calculate a religious pluralism index, which measures religious diversity, by using 
one minus the Herfindahl Index (sum of squares of religious adherence shares). The pluralism index 
measures the possibility of two randomly selected religious believers belonging to different religions. 
It equals zero when all randomly selected religious believers are in the same religion. Conversely, the 
pluralism index would be one when every randomly selected people are all in different religions. In 
Table 1 the pluralism is 0.710 in non-CCP group and 0.699 in CCP group indicating the abundant 
religions in China.  
Table A1-1, Table A1-2, Table A2-1, and Table A2-2 in the Appendix demonstrate the summary 
information of demographic characteristics, religiosity, and religious diversity in separate years. They 
are consistent with the pooled summary information in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Figure 1 illustrates the religious membership in CCP and non-CCP groups along the dimension 
of age. The black line is the percentage of religious believers among non-CCP individuals and the 
purple line is the percentage of religious believers among CCP members. The percentage of religious 
affiliation in non-CCP group is significantly larger than that in CCP group. Furthermore, religious 
affiliation of CCP members does not change with age, but religious affiliation in non-CCP group 
gradually increases with age. This result is different with our expectation about religious affiliation 
jump in CCP group and no change in non-CCP group after retirement.  
Figure 2 unravels a concern about whether the CCP members give up their CCP membership to 
believe in a religion after retirement, which can explain why percentage of religious affiliation in non-
CCP group gradually increases with age. Yet, Figure 2 indicates that the percentage of CCP members 
 
19 Folk Religion means some local Chinese religions, such as fortune-telling, jingzu, baoying, mingyun, and Tian. 
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in each age group even increased. This means CCP members do not switch their CCP membership to 
believe a religion implying that the regression does not have this switching problem. 
As I mentioned before, one of the contributions of this paper is to study how Chinese government 
uses economic incentives to influence people’s religious affiliation. Therefore, I check these two 
groups’ income and pension trend in Figure 3. This figure designates that the incomes and pension 
are higher in CCP group than that in the non-CCP group along all different age groups. This result is 
consistent with my research expectation, because the CCP members do have better income than non-
CCP members. This material benefits could be the Chinese government’s economic strategy to keep 
CCP members away from religious affiliation.  
 
2.4 Analysis  
The main challenge in estimating the relationship between the effects of retirement age and 
individual’s religious belief is that any religious affiliation changes might be correlated with age, 
education levels, or other unobserved factors. To solve this potential endogeneity problem, I use a 
difference in difference approach. This limits the endogeneity problem, which would exist if these 
covariates had differential impacts on religiosity for CCP and non-CCP members.  
The idea of the empirical analysis is as follows. The regulation on the religious beliefs of CCP 
members is very restrict by using economic benefits as the “penalty”. CCP members are expected to 
have more religious freedom after retirement, because they cannot influence the CCP political system 
a lot and they do not need to worry about forgone economic benefits (or punishments). Therefore, 
my main identification strategy is based on testing any changes in the CCP members’ religious 
affiliation near the retirement age.  To uncover the impact of the religious affiliation regulation on 
CCP members, I compare individual religious belief across CCP members and non-CCP individuals, 
before and after retirement age. I mainly use the Linear Probability Model (LPM), Logit, and Probit 
model with many other robustness checks and placebo test whose results are consistent with all the 
main results. The main empirical specification is in Eq. (1): 
 
𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑖 , 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,  𝑋𝑖] = F(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖) (1) 
 
This model equation means the conditional expected value of 𝑦𝑖 to be a general function of the 
index function. F represents different functions, such as the LPM, Logit, and Probit models. i denotes 
different individuals. The dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖 , is the religious belief dummy, 𝑦𝑖 = 1 means 
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individuals have a religious affiliation, 𝑦𝑖=0 means they do not. The variable, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑖, is dummy variable, 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑖 = 1  means the CCP members and 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑖 = 0  means non-CCP individuals. The time shock 
dummy variable in above model is the retirement age, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖, equaling one for male’s aged 60 
or older or female’s aged 55 years or older. 𝛽3 is the interaction coefficient of the interaction term between 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑖 and 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖. 𝑋𝑖 indicates all control variables comprising ethnicity index, residence place, 
gender, family size, age, age trend in CCP group, father’s CCP condition, mother’s CCP condition, 
education fixed effects, spouse’ CCP condition, education fixed effect and provinces fixed effects. 
The expected hypothesis: according to all above information, the probability than an individual chooses 
to openly state a religious affiliation should increase after retirement age by a larger margin for CCP 
members than for non-CCP members, if the CCP incentives are strong enough to repress an 
underlying level of religious affiliation.  
 
2.5 Empirical results 
Column (1) of the LPM results in Table 3 indicates that, without any control variables, the probability 
of CCP members’ having a religious affiliation is lower than that of non-CCP individuals. As more 
control variables are added into this regression, the probability difference of religious affiliation 
between CCP members and non-CCP individuals decrease and eventually become insignificant in 
column (6), suggesting that correlated observables drive the bulk of the observed difference across 
the two groups.  
When we do not control for the underlying age trend in columns (4) and (5), then retirement can 
affect people’s religious belief possibility reflecting the significant negative coefficients of “Interaction” 
in column (4) and column (5). However, after controlling the age trend, the coefficient in column (6) 
is insignificant, economically small and negative, -0.013. The results in Table 3 are opposite with the 
previous expected hypothesis. Thus, there is no evidence of any increase in religiosity after retirement. 
I perform a number of robustness tests to make sure that the findings are not due to some nuance 
of the chosen specifications. LPM frequently has a problem in which it generates coefficients that do 
not make sense for probability, outside the bounds of 0 and 1. The bigger problem is that fitting a 
straight line to data with a dichotomous dependent variable runs the risk of misidentifying the 
relationship between the independent variable and the dichotomous dependent variable. Therefore, 
to further check the results, I also use Logit and Probit regressions which can solve the LPM’s potential 
problem. The coefficients in column (2) and column (3) are average marginal effects in Table 4 and 
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coefficients of interaction term are insignificant and small which are consistent with the coefficients 
in Table 3 inferring the religious affiliation probability does not change between CCP members and 
non-CCP people before and after the retirement age. The insignificantly positive coefficient of 
retirement eligible indicates that retirement does not influence people’s religious belief behaviors.  
An additional concern is whether these individuals really retired after their legal retirement age. 
CGSS supports the straightforward information on retirement whose survey question is “Are you 
retired?” Then, in Table 5, given all same controls and fixed effects variables as in Table 3 and Table 
4, we use this retirement information as the “retirement eligible” in regressions. The outcomes in 
Table 5 are similar with the results in Table 3 and Table 4. Coefficients of “Interaction” are consistent 
with the coefficients in Table 3 and Table 4 inferring no more religious affiliation in CCP group after 
retirement compared with non-CCP group. However, Table 5 indicates the significantly decreased 
coefficients on “Retirement Eligible” implying that even more CCP members choose no religious 
affiliation after retirement. Therefore, the results in Table 5 also show opposite direction compared 
with the main hypothesis. 
Even though the income of CCP members is bigger than the income of non-CCP individuals 
which is showed in Figure 3, not every CCP member works in the government system, which is the 
main channel for material benefits. It is clearer to use the CCP members working in government 
system as the treatment group to estimate how the Chinese government successfully uses economic 
benefits to affect CCP members’ religious affiliation. I classify CCP members with government system 
jobs as the treatment group and treat non-CCP individuals as control group in LPM, logit, and Probit 
regressions. Using these new measures of CCP membership in the previous analysis can now be seen 
in Table 6. The results are similar with the results in Table 4: coefficients on CCP, Retirement eligible, 
and Interaction term are all insignificantly negative small. Especially the coefficients of interaction 
term demonstrate that there is no difference in religious affiliation probability between CCP members 
and non-CCP individuals before and after the retirement age. Compared with coefficient of interaction 
term in LPM, the 10% significant -0.03, the coefficients in Logit and Probit models are more reliable 
as I explained before. These results are opposite with our hypothesis as well, but consistent with results 
in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 inferring that the regulations of religious belief on CCP members 
maybe not the reasons about few CCP members choose to believe religion. 
Among religious believers, some of them go to religious activities more frequently than others do. 
Therefore, I use religiosity as the dependent variable to run all above regressions again whose results 
are in Table 7. For robustness checks, I also classify the dependent dummy variable as follows: treat 
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religiosity with the “<1 per year” whose religious activities is less than one time per year as zero and 
treat all the other religiosity whose religious activities is more than one time per year as one.  All other 
regressors are as same as in Table 3. The interaction term is again insignificant. Because the surveyed 
sample size limitation in CGSS, I do not classify other religiosity groups to do more religiosity tests.  
One may argue that CCP members do not change their religious affiliation immediately after their 
retirement or may change their religious affiliation before their retirement. Therefore, I use fake 
retirement age placebo test to do more tests in Table 8. Instead of legal retirement age, I set up age 50 
as the retirement age in columns (1)-(3). The results are again very similar to those before. Next, I set 
age 65 years as the retirement age and find similar results.  
One remaining concern is that because the analysis uses a repeated cross section, the nature of the 
survey may induce some measurement error into the data. Specifically, I do not observe the exact 
same individuals before and after retirement. This would matter because while some individuals may 
report being religious or non-religious, individuals surveyed after retirement who do choose to become 
religious may leave the CCP. This would then not be captured in the previous regressions. In order to 
test for this possibility, I undertake two exercises. First, I compare the share of the population who is 
a CCP across the retirement threshold on the basis of age. There is no significant change in the share 
of individuals reporting being members, which suggests this is not a large data issue. As a second step, 
I construct a synthetic panel using age cohorts and age and gender cohorts.20 This allows me to 
construct a pseudo-panel in which I run a regression of the impact of retirement eligibility on religiosity 
controlling for religious affiliation. The results of this regression are presented in Table 10. As with 
previous analysis, the cohort panel method generates no significant change in religiosity, consistent 




Even though China has globalized its economy and reduced the level of regulations on religious 
behavior in China, there are still many implicit regulations for members of the CCP party. Because the 
legal system of the Chinese government stipulates those Chinese citizens have religious freedom, the 
question is how to measure whether the Chinese government’s policies can be empirically seen in 
survey data. This paper is a first attempt to answer some of these questions and provide clarity on 
 
20 Summary statistics for the sample size of these cohorts can be found in Appendix Tables A3 and A4. 
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how Chinese government uses the religious belief regulation in the Constitution of the Communist 
Party of China and economics benefits to affect people’s religious affiliation. 
To summarize, this paper examines Chinese government’s economic strategy effects on religious 
affiliation using a novel test based on retirement age – classifying people into CCP group and non-
CCP group through a difference in difference model. I find no significant difference on religious 
affiliation between CCP group and non-CCP group before and after the retirement age. What this 
paper can do is rule out that there is a large uptick in religiosity. Given this, the lack of an increase 
could reflect several things. Specifically, non-religious individuals select in the CCP, or individuals who 
are non-religious in the CCP for the majority of their lives become accustomed to this and remain so 
after retirement or perhaps there is some degree of lingering benefits associated with CCP membership 
even after government employment ends which is large enough to disincentivize religious uptake. All 
above reasons could be a future topic for research given the expansion of religious belief and practices 
in China and the existing tension between the government, party, and non-governmental institutions 




Figure 2. 1: Religious belief trend along age in both CCP and non-CCP groups 
 
 
Notes: CGSS surveyed individuals’ religious belief information ranging 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, and 2015. The Y axis is the religious belief rate. The X axis is individual age. The religious belief 
rate in different associated CCP and non-CCP groups is calculated by using the number of religious 
believers in specific age group divided by the number of individuals in that specific age group. The 
religious belief trend in non-CCP group is much higher than the trend in the CCP group. The religious 
belief trend even does not change after the retirement age which is around 60 years old.  
 












Figure 2. 2: CCP membership trend along age 
 
Notes: CGSS surveyed individuals’ CCP membership information ranging 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, and 2015. The Y axis is the percentage of CCP members in different age group. The X 
axis is individual age group. The percentage of CCP members trend even increased around 50 years 
old. 
 




Figure 2. 3: Aggregate CCP and non-CCP income and pension check 
 
 
Notes: The Y axis is the personal annually average income whose measurement is RMB. The X axis 
is individual age. The black line is the non-CCP people’s income trend. The purple line is the CCP 
members’ income trend. We see a big gap between these two groups, even after retirement. 
 


























































Table 2. 1: Summary statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full CCP Non-CCP  Difference 
Jobs Proportion 
Public servant 0.019 0.104 0.009 0.096*** 
SOE 0.129 0.243 0.115 0.128*** 
Institution 0.034 0.073 0.030 0.044*** 
Other 0.818 0.579 0.847 -0.267*** 
Political Status 
CCP 0.109 1 0 1*** 
Education Levels 
< Primary 0.128 0.041 0.138 -0.098*** 
Primary 0.230 0.109 0.245 -0.136*** 
Middle school 0.299 0.204 0.310 -0.107*** 
High school 0.125 0.141 0.123 0.017*** 
Secondary School 0.074 0.116 0.069 0.047*** 
Junior college 0.076 0.183 0.063 0.120*** 
College 0.062 0.180 0.048 0.132*** 
Graduate 0.006 0.027 0.003 0.023*** 
Basic Information 
Minority 0.077 0.062 0.079 -0.016 
Urban 0.582 0.768 0.559 0.209*** 
Female 0.517 0.266 0.548 -0.282*** 
Family Size 3.233 2.989 3.263 -0.275*** 
 (2.019) (1.994) (2.021)  
Age 46.760 52.277 46.088 6.189*** 
 (16.117) (16.091) (15.991)  
Regional Characteristics 
East 0.405 0.492 0.394 0.098*** 
Middle 0.351 0.299 0.357 -0.058*** 
West 0.244 0.208 0.248 -0.040*** 
N 75909 8241 67501   
Notes: Results are calculated by using CGSS samples from 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 
and 2015. Estimates are survey weighted. Standard deviations in parentheses are included where 
informative. Total number of observations is 75,909 for the full sample, 67,501 for the non-CCP 
group, and 8,241 for the CCP group. CCP members and other entities are calculated separately public 
servant is people who works in the government administer system. SOE is the state-owned enterprise. 
Institution is government system owned organizations. CCP means China Communist Party. 
"<primary" infers education level is less than primary school. "Primary" is the primary school. "Middle 
school" and "High school" are similar education system in U.S. "Secondary school" is technical school. 
"Junior college" is the three years college. "College" is the four years college. "Graduate" means people 
with the graduate education, such as master and PhD. Minority means minority rate among all 
households. Urban means the urban living household rate. Female is the individual gender 
information. Family size is the total number of family members. Age is the individual average age. 
East, Middle, and West are the household living areas in China. The difference column is the t-test 
for the difference between CCP and non-CCP groups. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 2. 2: Religiosity and religious classes summary statistics   
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
Full CCP Non-CCP  Difference 
Panel A: Religious Belief Rate 
Belief 0.112 0.061 0.118 -0.007*** 
N 75909 8241 67501  
Panel B: Religiosity (Frequency Attendance) 
<1 per year 0.884 0.930 0.879 0.051*** 
 >1 per year 0.073 0.052 0.075 -0.024 
1 per month 0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.005 
1 per week 0.025 0.010 0.027 -0.017*** 
>1 per week 0.009 0.004 0.010 -0.005 
N 66675 7416 59092   
Panel C: Religious Classes Proportion 
Buddhism 0.054 0.028 0.058 -0.030 
Daoism 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001*** 
Folk Religion 0.021 0.012 0.022 -0.010*** 
Islam 0.020 0.016 0.020 -0.004 
Catholicism 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 
Protestantism 0.019 0.004 0.021 -0.017*** 
Others 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0 
No Religion 0.879 0.936 0.872 0.064*** 
Pluralism 0.710 0.699 0.710  
N 65566 7126 58273   
Notes: The Results are calculated by using CGSS sample from 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013 and 2015. Estimates are survey weighted. Table 2 is about the pooled 
religiosity and the religious classes. Because there is religious belief in 2006 but religiosity 
and religious classes information, the number of observations is different in three panels. 
"Belief” is whether this people believe in any religion. "<1 per year" is the frequency of 
religious event participation less than one time per year including atheism people.  ">1 
per year" is more than one time per year containing one or several religious event 
participations per year. "1 per month" is one-time religious event participation per 
month. "1 per week" is the one-time religious participation per week, which also include 
two or three times per month. ">1 per week" is about more than one-time religious 
event participation. "Pluralism" is religious pluralism index which is calculated by using 
one minus the Herfindahl Index (sum of squares of religious adherence shares). "Folk 
Religion" means some local Chinese religions, such as fortune-telling, jingzu, baoying, 
mingyun, and Tian. "Others" includes Hindu, Orthodox, Judaism and other Chinese 
local Gods. The meaning of all other religion categories is same as their variable names.  






















Table 2. 3: LPM basic regression results 
Religious Belief 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CCP -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.046*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 0.027 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.017) 
Retirement Eligible  0.034*** 0.040*** 0.024*** 0.033*** 0.007 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Interaction   -0.049*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.013 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)       
 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Age trend control    No No Yes 
Fixed effect    No Yes Yes        
 
R-sq 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.047 0.126 0.127 
N 75,712 75,712 75,712 68,316 68,316 68,312 
Notes: The data set in the regression is spanning 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015. 
All standard errors in parentheses. CCP is a individual dummy variable to classify treatment 
group, CCP members and control group, non-CCP individuals. Retirement eligible is the time 
shock dummy variable to classify before and after legal retirement age, 0 means that male is 
younger than 60 years and female is younger than 55 years, 1 means male is older than 60 years 
and female is older than 55 years. Interaction is the "CCP*Retirement eligible". Controls include 
ethnicity, living in urban or not, gender, family size, father's CCP condition, mother CCP 
condition, spouse CCP condition, age. Age trend control is the age trend influence on CCP 
members. Fixed effect includes education fixed effect and province fixed effect. R-square 









Table 2. 4: Nonlinear aggregate regression results 
  LPM Logit Marginal Probit Marginal 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CCP 0.027 0.032 0.027 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) 
Retirement eligible 0.007 0.002 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Interaction -0.013 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.016)    
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Age trend control Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes     
 
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.143 0.142     
N 68,312 68,312 68,312 
Notes: The data set in the regression is spanning 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013 and 2015. All standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in Logit, 
and Probit models are marginal effects here. All variables' definitions 
including controls, age trend control, and fixed effect refer to Table 3. Adjust 
R square measures the model fitness.  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
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Table 2. 5: Aggregate regression results-retirement dummy 
  LPM Logit Marginal Probit Marginal 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CCP 0.029* 0.020 0.017 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) 
Retirement Eligible -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Interaction -0.003 -0.017 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.015)    
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Age trend control Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes     
 
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.143 0.142     
N 68,312 68,312 68,312 
Notes: The data set in the regression is spanning 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013 and 2015. All standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in 
Logit, and Probit models are marginal effects here. All variables' 
definitions including controls, age trend control, and fixed effect refer to 
Table 3. Adjust R square measures the model fitness. The retirement 
dummy variable is from the CGSS survey question's answer on 
retirement. Adjust R square measures the model fitness. *p<0.1, 





































Table 2. 6: Group robustness check: GOV=1, CCP=1 
  LPM Logit Marginal Probit Marginal 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CCP -0.005 -0.037 -0.034 
 (0.024) (0.045) (0.042) 
Retirement Eligible 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Interaction -0.030* -0.054 -0.047 
 (0.017) (0.036) (0.032)    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Age trend control Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes     
 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.143 0.143     
N 54,882 54,882 54,882 
Notes: The data set in the regression is spanning 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013 and 2015. All standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in Logit, and 
Probit models are marginal effects here. CCP here means CCP members in 




Table 2. 7: Religiosity robustness check 
  LPM Logit Marginal Probit Marginal 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CCP 0.022 0.029 0.025 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.023) 
Retirement Eligible 0.010* 0.006 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Interaction 0.000 0.019 0.015 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.017)    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Age trend control Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes     
 
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.111 0.111 
N 61,872 61,872 61,872 
Notes: The data set in the regression is spanning 2005, 2008, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015. All standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients in Logit, and Probit models are marginal effects here. The 
dependent variable is different religiosity classification, religious 
belief=0 when people go to religious activities less than one time per 
year, religious belief==1 when people go to religious activities more 
than one time per year. All independent variables' definitions refer to 



















Table 2. 8: Fake retirement age placebo test 
 Assumed 50 years old retirement Assumed 65 years old retirement 
 Placebo 50 Logit50 Probit50 Placebo 65 Logit65 Probit65 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CCP 0.045*** 0.048* 0.042* 0.033** 0.043* 0.037* 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.025) (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) 
Retirement Eligible -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.016*** 0.009* 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Interaction 0.010 0.018 0.018 -0.010 0.010 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age trend control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 68,312 68,312 68,312 68,312 68,312 68,312 
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.143 0.142 0.128 0.143 0.142 
Notes: The data set in the regression is spanning 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015. All 
standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in Logit, and Probit models are marginal effects here. 
In the first three column we change the legal retirement age to 50 years old. From column (4) to 
column (6), we change the legal retirement age to 65 years old. All variables' definitions including 













Chapter 3: How Do Political Events Affect the Number of Missing Women? 
Evidence from the Egyptian Arab Spring 
3.1 Introduction 
The Arab Spring is the biggest political movement in Arab World in recent years. It started in Tunisia, 
then immediately spread the democratic protests and movements to other countries. In Egypt, the 
protest against President Mubarak and his party's autocratic regime started in January 2011. Many 
protesters were killed, injured, and arrested due to conflicts between the protesters and the Mubarak 
government during this period. The uniqueness of the Arab Spring is that many women had 
participated in the protests since the beginning (Shalaby, 2016). In the protest during 2011, people 
mainly focused on the food and social justice but not the women's rights (Costello et al., 2015). The 
Mubarak government fell quickly after the beginning of the protest. Then, the military ruled Egypt 
from February 2011 to June 2012. After the military rule, Egyptian people elected the Islamist 
Mohammed Morsi as the president. Because Morsi tried to implement the empowerment policy for 
himself and other policies against women, another big protest started from June to July 2013 
(Acemoglu et al., 2018). This protest began to defend and maintain women's rights and continued 
until the time of president Adly Mansour (Zaki, 2015). 
Our research focuses on whether the Egyptian protests during the Arab Spring reduced missing 
women, how missing women changed in different age groups, and the different effects of different 
protests on missing women. Women’s participation in the Arab Spring protest may have helped them 
gain more empowerment through political participation and realize gender equality including but not 
limited to more respect, more medical care, and more food, etc., which could reduce the missing 
women in Egypt after the Arab Spring. Increased exposure of women to political activities could 
improve gender equality. Therefore, we investigate the missing women through the heterogenous 
protest intensities in different governorates. Then according to the heterogeneous protest intensity in 
different governorates, heterogeneous women’s involvement in protests, and the information on 
missing women before and after the Arab Spring, we conduct a Difference-in-Differences analysis on 
changes of female death rates. We use the Egyptian Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in 2014 
to estimate the missing women. This dataset contains the information on children and the family, 
including children’s age, gender, birth year, birth order, the parents’ work information, education, and 
household’s location, etc. We focus on how the missing women changes in different protest intensity 
regions before and after the Arab Spring. We also analyze the effects of different protests in different 
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phases of the Arab Spring on missing women. The baseline results indicate that compared to the low 
protest intensity governorates, the missing women significantly decreased in those high protest 
intensity governorates after the Arab Spring. Furthermore, we also discovered that the effects of the 
Arab Spring started reducing the missing women in Phase 1 of this Arab Spring, then further reduced 
after Phase 3. We also found that the reduced the number of missing women is different in different 
age groups, with the strongest effect being present in the younger age groups. We argue that the 
reasons for the reduced missing women could be the improvement of food, medical care, and respect. 
In support of our findings, we also examined the sensitivity of the baseline results based on different 
controls and specifications. For robustness check, we also checked the structure of population and 
used the propensity score reweighting. All these robustness check results are consistent. 
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review. Section 3 provides the measurement of missing women, treatment and control areas 
classification, and empirical model, and dataset information. Section 4 provides empirical results. 
Section 5 provides a conclusion. 
 
3.2 Literature and contribution 
Missing women first got attention from the estimation in Sen’s paper in 1990, where he estimated 
more than 100 million missing women around the world in 1990s. In his definition, missing women 
is the number of women who would be alive in the absence of gender discrimination. Missing women 
are the sum of women missing at birth and excess female mortality through infanticide, neglect or 
poor treatment (Sen, 1990). Then, more papers studied the missing women though many different 
aspects such as gender discrimination, survival conditions, and nutrition in developing countries 
revealing a variety of negative conditions hurting women's survival rates (Kynch and Sen, 1983; Kynch, 
1985; Sen, 1989; D’Souza and Chen, 1980). Even though more people and researchers are beginning 
to pay attention to missing women problem, and a growing international effort for gender equality as 
highlighted in the Millennium Development Goals of the U.N., according to the report from Our 
World in Data (Bongaarts & Guilmoto, 2015), the number of missing women increased to 136.1 
million in 2015. 
Missing women is a common and a growing problem in developing countries. Despite significant 
gains in economic development, discrimination of girls and women continue, and the increasing use 
of the gender selection tools to abort girls cause a persistence in missing women problem 
(Jayachandran, 2015). The smaller size and poorer families also prefer sons more than the larger size 
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and richer families in India (Clark, 2000). This kind of preference also leads to the worse health and 
food conditions for girls, which cause higher female mortality rate (Gupta, 1987). In addition to the 
gender discrimination of women, the women's income earning contribution to family could be another 
influential reason for excess women death. One reason that people do not want to have daughters 
could be the higher income earnings of men (Qian, 2008). In China, the missing women in the areas 
with more tea farms is less than the areas with other kind of farms, because the tea farms need more 
women to collect tea leaves which can improve the women's income in their families (Qian, 2008). In 
terms of income, the resource allocation is another important factor for girls’ survival rate. According 
to the social pension program, when women distribute the resource and food in the family, the 
surviving girls significantly increase, while it does not influence the survival condition of boys (Duflo, 
2021; Chen et al., 1981). Previous studies focused on the effects of political elements on the 
improvement of societal conditions of women. An interesting experiment was about how the exposure 
of women to the political activities improved the women political leaders’ voting condition. In India, 
one research team randomly assigned some specific number of women leaders for leadership positions 
on village councils and observed them for around ten years. After this random assignment of gender 
quotas for leadership, people’s attitude changed and accepted the women leadership which could 
improve the social welfare and demonstrate the advantage of women's leadership (Beaman et al., 2009). 
In 2017, according to the report from United Nations Development Program, the gender 
inequality index of Egypt was 0.449 which ranks it 115 in 189 countries and where zero means perfect 
gender equality. In Egypt, 34% of women are subject to domestic violence and have comparatively 
worse health conditions (Diop-Sidibe et al., 2006; Zaghloul & Megahed, 2019). Meanwhile in Egypt 
the death rate of women is also much higher than in developed countries (Zaghloul & Megahed, 2019). 
When women claimed their rights during the Arab Spring, the conflict between the women’s rights 
and conservative Islamist were large (Badran, 2019). Bargain et al. (2019) discussed how the Arab 
Spring democratic protest enhanced women’s empowerment in family through various empowerment 
measurements. 
Furthermore, previous research focused on the reasons and results of the gender inequality and 
how some experimental programs improve the women's societal conditions, empowerment in family, 
or political role. However, they did not discuss whether the societal political movements or women’s 
participation in these movements can improve the gender equality.  
Our paper is the first that directly examines how the social or political events affect the missing 
women. Many scholars have discussed how the Arab Spring affected liberty, food, corruption and 
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other social and economic problems. At the same time, these ideals can secure on improvement of 
women's rights or gender equality. Compared to the missing women in the low level of protest 
intensity regions, the missing women significantly decreased more in the high level of protest intensity 
regions after the Arab Spring. The second contribution of this paper is the missing women 
measurement which is originally from the paper of Anderson and Ray (2017). They only use that 
missing women measurement to estimate the missing women in different age groups in one year. We 
do not only use this measurement to measure the missing women in different age groups in one year, 
but also to measure missing women in the same age group in different years and compare the same 
age group of missing women in different years. The third contribution of this paper is that we examine 
protest heterogeneity and explore how different protests affect the missing women differently. The 
fourth contribution of this paper is that we analyze how Egyptian protests affected missing women in 
different age groups. 
 
3.3 Data and Empirical model 
3.3.1 Missing women measurement 
To estimate the missing women in different age groups, in different regions, and in different years, we 
employ the calculation method on missing women from Anderson and Ray (2009). Their calculation 
method only estimates the missing women in different age groups in one year, but we extended this 
calculation to measure the missing women in different age groups across different years and to 
compare the missing women in same age group across different years. In the following equation, 𝑎 
refers to an age group, where 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝑛. 𝑎 = 0 indicates the birth group. When 𝑎 ≥ 1, 𝑎 denotes 
information between the age 𝑎 − 1 and 𝑎. At the same time 𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑚(𝑎) and  𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑤(𝑎) represent the death 
rates of men and women at the age group 𝑎 in regions 𝑖 which we are interested in and in the year 𝑡21. 
We also use the ?̂?𝑡
𝑚(𝑎) and ?̂?𝑡








 is the men's death ratio. The numerator is the number of dead men in region 𝑖, at age 𝑎, in 







 is the women's death ratio. The numerator is the number of dead women in region 𝑖, at age 𝑎, 
in year 𝑡 from DHS. The denominator is the total number of women in region 𝑖 , at age 𝑎, in year 𝑡 from DHS.  
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reference region at age 𝑎 in year 𝑡22. Then we conduct the reference death rate of women at age 𝑎 in 
the region of interest which is the following equation (1). 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡






                                                                                                         (1)   
 
The missing women at age 𝑎 in the region of interest 𝑖 at a given time 𝑡 equals the actual death 






𝑤(𝑎)                                                                               (2) 
 
where 𝜋𝑖𝑡
𝑤(𝑎) is the starting population of women at age 𝑎. 
For the robustness check we also use the relative death ratio as the dependent variable. We use 





                                                                                                                                                                            (3) 
 
According to the above calculation methods and the information from DHS, in our calculation, 
we classify observations into seven age groups in each year from 2007 to 2014 for the treatment and 
control areas. The first age group is from 0 to 1, which is called “age1” group. The second age group 
is from 1 to 4, which is called “age14” group. The third age group is from 5 to 9, which is called 
“age59” group. The fourth age group is from 10 to 14, which is called “age1014” group. The fifth age 
group is from 15 to 19, which is called “age1519” group.  The sixth age group is from 20 to 24, which 
is called “age2024” group.  The seventh age group is from 25 to 29, which is called “age2529” group. 
The missing women changes in different age groups are indicated in Table 8. Due to the limitation of 




𝑚(𝑎) is the number of dead men divided by the number of men, which is 100,000, at the age 𝑎 in the year 
𝑡. ?̂?𝑡
𝑤(𝑎) is the number of dead men divided by the number of women, which is 100,000, at the age 𝑎 in the 
year 𝑡. The benchmark or reference region is the group of Established Market Economics as defined by the 
World Bank: Western Europe, Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. 
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3.3.2 Treatment and control groups 
We classify the treatment and control groups in two ways. Firstly, we classify the treatment and control 
groups based on the fatality, injury, and arrested information separately during the entire Arab Spring 
period. The group (or area) classification based on the fatality index during the Arab Spring is the 
same as the group classification based on the injured index and arrested people index during this 
period. This classification is used for the baseline result. Secondly, to check the different effects of 
different protests in different phases of the Arab Spring on the missing women, we use the fatality 
information in each phase of the Arab Spring to categorize treatment and control groups for each 
phase, given that there is no information on the injured and arrested people in Phase 1 and no 
information on the arrested people in Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Arab Spring. 
The Egyptian protest was influenced by the protests in Tunisia. To better understand our 
treatment and control groups classification and our main discussion in this paper, it is better to review 
all the important phases during the Arab Spring from 2011 to 2014. There are four phases, which are 
ruled through three different parties, Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP), Military, 
and the Muslim Brotherhood, during Arab Spring (Bargain et al., 2019; Acemoglu et al., 2018; Egyptian 
Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2015). The stated goal of each protest in each phase is 
different from 2011 to 2014.  
The protests in the first phase of the Egyptian revolution are about the Hosni Mubarak and his 
authoritarian and corrupt regime, lasting for 18 days from January 25, 2011, to February 11, 2011, and 
started right after the demonstrations in Tunisia in December 2010. The goal or reason of this protest 
was to call for equality and solve the corruption problem in Hosni Mubarak regime (Al Arabiya, 2011; 
Karagiannopoulos, 2012). Starting with this first wave of protests many women took an active 
participation and involvement in the protest movement (Frederiksen, 2011; Egyptian Center for 
Economic and Social Rights, 2015).  
The second phase was after the fall of Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP) and 
lasted from February 11, 2011, to June 30, 2012. During this time, the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces was responsible for the temporary ruling of Egypt. There were several big protests in this 
second phase as well. The goals or the reasons of these protests were about dignity demand, liberty, 
government election, and social justice (Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2015; Ross 




The third phase was from June 2012 to the end of June 2013 during the Muslim Brotherhood 
ruled Egypt. Mohammed Morsi representing the Muslim Brotherhood was elected as the president of 
Egypt. However, Mohammed Morsi tried to implement many strict policies which were unpopular 
for large segments of the Egyptian population leading to further protests (Kirkpatrick & Sheikh, 2012; 
Taylor, 2017; Knell, 2012)23. Mohammed Morsi was also trying to resume the traditional Islamism 
requirements on women which lead to a protest to defend the gained women's rights (Egyptian Center 
for Economic and Social Rights, 2015). 
The fourth phase was from July 2013 to June 2014 which was ruled by President Adly Mansour 
in Egypt. The military stayed in power until El-Sissi was elected as president in June 2014. In this 
phase, many supporters of Mohammed Morsi went to protest. Meanwhile, president Adly Mansour 
implemented the anti-protest policies. Therefore, there were also many protests and conflict during 
this phase. The killed, injured, and arrested protesters were even worse. 
For the baseline analysis, to classify the treatment group and the control group, we mainly use the 
Egyptian Revolution Database from January 2011 to June 2014 which was collected by the Egyptian 
Center for Economic and Social Rights (2015). This data set contains the information on the number 
of killed, injured, and arrested in different phases of Egyptian revolution. For robustness check, we 
also use the Survey for Young People in Egypt (SYPE) to classify the treatment and control groups. 
When we classify the treatment and control groups based on protest intensity, we dropped the 
five border governorates first24. The border governorates are occupied by Bedouins who have nomadic 
traditions. The reactions of these groups could be different from others in the inner cities (Bargain et 
al., 2019). These border governorates are deserts so according to the Egypt Census from 2010 to 2015 
only around 2% of Egyptians were living in those governorates. Meanwhile, they have their own 
conflicts, such as the conflict between the Sinai Peninsula and the nearby Palestinian Gaza strip. For 
robustness check, we report results including these five border governorates in Table 6, which are 
consistent with the baseline result. 
Then, we use the number of killed, injured, and arrested information at the governorate level 
during the entire Arab Spring and separately divide the average population of the related governorates 
from census information to obtain a measure of incidents per inhabitant which are represented by the 
vertical lines in Figure 1. 
 
23 For example, Mohammed Morsi implemented an Islamic-leaning constitution leading to a huge opposition. He also 
tried to implement a temporary presidential decree which could give himself a huge power. 








× 100,000                                                                                                                                           (4) 
 
Even though there is no information on the injured protestors in Phase 1 and arrested protesters in 
the first two phases, we still use the existing information to calculate these two indexes. The reason is 
that we treat the Arab Spring as one big period. Therefore, according to equation (4), we separately 
calculate the index of fatality, index of injured protesters, and the index of arrested protesters for 
different governorates during the entire Arab Spring. In equation (4), the numerator,  𝑁𝑗𝑘 , is the total 
killed injured, and arrested protesters during the entire Arab Spring in different governorates in Egypt. 
The denominator, 𝑃𝑘, is the average of population from 2011 to 2014 in different governorates. 𝑗 
implies whether the calculation of index is for killed, injured, or arrested protestors. 𝑘 represents 
different governorates. After calculating the fatality index, injured index, and arrested index, we pick 
related median fatality index, median injured index, and median arrested index. According to these 
three indexes, we classify the treatment and control groups three times, fatality index classification, 
injured index classification, and the arrested index classification. The treatment and control groups’ 
classifications in these three indexes are 100% consistent, which are the different color vertical lines 
in Figure 1. The governorates with higher incident number than the median index are included in the 
treatment group and the rest are included in the control group. We mainly use this classification in 
this paper. The only two exceptions are when we check whether the protest intensity is consistent in 
different phases during the Arab Spring and check the different effects of different protests on missing 
women. 
 
3.3.3 Alternative treatments based on different phases and women’s participation 
We only use the information on fatalities in different phases during the Arab Spring to classify the 
governorates into treatment and control groups to check the different effects of different protests in 
different phases and to check whether the treatment and the control groups are consistent in different 
phases during the Arab Spring, because the fatality information is consistent from Phase 1 to Phase 4. 
The calculation for the index of fatality in different phases is the equation (5). 𝑘  represents the 
different governorates. 𝑡 means the different years from 2011 to 2014. After getting different fatality 
indexes for different governorates in different phases during the Arab Spring, we select the associated 
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median fatality index among all governorates in each phase to classify the treatment and control groups. 
The classification in each phase is in Figure 2. It reveals that the treatment and control groups overlap 
around 70% between each phase in the Arab Spring. The classification in different phases is also 70%, 
consistent with the group classification in Figure 1. 
 




× 100,000                                                                                                                                                              (5) 
 
To further check the treatment and control groups’ classification, we also get the Survey of Young 
People in Egypt (SYPE). SYPE includes the information on protest participation of women whose 
age is from 18 to 35 in non-border governorates and their attitude on protests. According to this 
information in SYPE, we conduct a governorate-level measure of women's participation in the Arab 
Spring protests. The classification variable equals to 1 if they participate any protest or support any 
protest in the Arab Spring, otherwise it equals 0. This classification, which is in Figure 3, is 70% 
overlapped with the classification from Egyptian Revolution Database in Figure 1. 
 
3.3.4 Data set information 
In addition to the equations (1) and (2), we use the information from Egyptian DHS in 2014 to 
calculate the missing women. The DHS also includes the household characteristics, children’s features, 
health and living conditions, and parents’ information. It includes the panel information on children 
from 1978 to 2014 at the household level. Because the missing women’s information has a big 
fluctuation before 2007 and the information of DHS from 1978 to 2006 is too far away from the Arab 
Spring and cannot reflect the missing women condition very well near 2011, we only use the 
information from 2007 to 2014. From 2007 to 2010 the political situation was stable and no big 
changes in women’s conditions were reported (Bargain, 2019). The data collection time of DHS is 
also good for our estimation because the collection time of DHS, which was from April to May 2014, 
was at the end of Arab Spring and the election time of El-Sissi. Due to the different culture and 
population density in border governorates which we mentioned in the last section, we do not include 
the households from border governorates in our main analysis. After the above dataset cleaning, the 
summary statistics are reported in Table 1. In the DHS dataset, the missing women information of 
children from 0 to 1 year old is stable, thus this paper mainly analyzes the missing women in this age 
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group. Therefore, the following discussions are mainly about the information of children from 0 to 1 
year old. 
The treatment and control groups classification in Table 1 is based on the aggregate-level 
classification which includes the fatality index classification, injured index classification, and the 
arrested index classification from equation (4). The summary information is at the household level. 
Table 1 reports the demographic information of respondents in the upper panel, their husbands' 
information in the middle panel, and the households' information in the lower panel. The upper panel 
shows that the women in high protest intensity areas get significantly higher-level education than those 
in the low protest intensity areas. Meanwhile, the rate of female labor participation in the high protest 
intensity areas is also significantly higher than that in the low protest intensity regions. Even though 
the average age of women in the high protest intensity areas, statistically speaking, is significantly 
higher, the difference in age is not very large. The number of children ever born is also similar. The 
middle panel presents the demographic information on respondents’ husbands. The difference in 
husband’s education between the high protest intensity and the low protest intensity regions is 
significant but very small. The low panel signifies the summary information of households. There is 
no big difference of women household head rate, religious belief, and households’ average age. In the 
high protest intensity regions, however, there are more households in the urban areas than those in 
the low protest intensity regions. The household size (i.e., the number of household members) is 
significantly smaller in the high protest intensity areas than that in the low protest intensity areas. The 
women size, the number of women in a given household, shows significantly fewer women in high 
protest intensity areas than in the low protest intensity areas. The wealth in this table means the wealth 
indexes reported in the DHS and includes poor, middle, richer, and richest. The higher number of 
wealth means richer. We see the households are richer in high protest intensity areas than those in the 
low protest intensity areas. 
Because our measurement on missing women in Egypt is from equations (1) and (2), we need to 
get the death ratio information of the benchmark or reference region and the death ratio information 
of Egypt. Therefore, all necessary information of indexes for missing women calculation are 
summarized in Table 2. In Table 2, the relative death ratio is equal to the death ratio of women divided 
by the death ratio of men in age1 group. Table 2 indicates that the death ratios of men and women in 
Egypt are three or four times higher than the related death ratios in the reference region. The relative 
death ratio in the reference region is smaller than one, meaning there is a higher boys’ death ratio than 
72 
 
the girls’ death ratio. Oppositely, the relative death ratio in Egypt is larger than one, which suggests a 
higher girls’ death ratio than boys’ death ratio.  
In addition to the death ratio comparison between the reference region and Egypt in Table 2, we 
also compare the death ratio of women, the death ratio of men, the relative death ratio, the reference 
death ratio of women, and the starting population of women in age1 group,  𝜋, between the high level 
of protest intensity region and the low level of protest intensity region from 2007 to 2014 in Table 3 
and Table 4. In Table 3 and 4, we see that all these ratios are smaller in higher level of protest intensity 
governorates than in the lower protest intensity governorates. Furthermore, the summary information 
of missing women trend from 2007 to 2014 is in Figure 4, indicating that the missing women has 
decreased in the treatment area. Meanwhile, the missing women did not change from 2011 to 2013 in 
the control area. However, the missing women also decreased after 2013 in the control area, arguably 
due to the protest focusing more on the women's rights in the whole country.  
Figure 4 also suggests that before the Arab Spring, the number of missing women in the control 
area was higher than that in the treatment area and the trend of missing women in both treatment and 
control areas are similar. The similar trend before the Arab Spring implies that no major event 
influenced missing women in Egypt from 2007 to 2010. After the Arab Spring, the missing women in 
the treatment group decreased more than that in the control group, which is a flat line from Phase 1 
to Phase 3 but decreases in Phase 4. We also observed that the missing women trend increased from 
2009 to 2011 for both treatment and control groups. Even though the influence of the Arab Spring 
on the control group is not obvious, the flatter trend of missing women in the control group still hints 
at possible effects of the Arab Spring on missing women. The decreased missing women in the 
treatment group implies that the effect of the Arab Spring in the treatment group is bigger than that 
in the control group. Since the Phase 1 of the Arab Spring, many women participated in the protest, 
but in Phase 3, the protest focused even more on calling for the gender equality because of the 
reactions to previous Pres. Mori’s policies (Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2021). 




3.3.5 Empirical model 
We mainly use the Difference-in-Differences estimation for the regression analysis25. 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑎 = 𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑡(𝑎) 
measures the missing women, calculated from equations (1) and (2), in the region of interest 𝑖 in year 
𝑡 at age a. For robustness check, 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑎 = 𝜌  from equation (3) also estimates the missing women using 
the relative death ratio in the region of interest 𝑖 in year 𝑡 at age 𝑎. 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 = 1 means the missing 
women in high protest intensity governorates and 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 = 0 means the missing women in low 
protest intensity governorates. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 1 means the post-Arab Spring period from 2011 to 2014 and 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 0  indicates the pre-Arab Spring period from 2007 to 2010. According to the children’s 
information from 2007 to 2014 in DHS and missing women calculation, we use the following 
Difference-in-Differences model in Eq. (6). 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑎 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 × 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑎 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡𝑎                                  (6) 
 
The coefficient 𝛽1  of the interaction term is the difference-in-difference estimation term, 
measuring the changes of missing women between the treatment and control groups before and after 
the Arab Spring revolution. 𝛽2, the coefficient of 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 estimates the aggregate factors that affect 
the outcome in the same way for both groups. 𝛽3 the coefficient of treatment variable estimates the 
differences between the treatment and control groups on average. 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑎  controls the observable 
characteristics including wealth of households, work condition of respondents, urban or rural 
residence, number of children in the households, education of the respondents, age of respondents, 
age of husband, husbands' work condition, religion, and birth order of children. For sensitivity check, 
we also include the fixed effects at the municipality level. We cluster the standard errors at the 
municipality level in this model. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Main results 
Table 4 shows the analytical results from the empirical model, equation (6) in section 3.5, with the 
missing women calculated from equations (1) and (2), or (3). The upper panel is the main result with 
 
25 The estimations are done in Stata 17 using the Difference-in-differences command from Bargain (2019). The 
command is “quietly xi: areg ibp post_group post $xlist $xcoh, cluster(ID_2) absorb(ID_2)”.  
74 
 
and without more control variables in different columns. The “Post x Treat” in this panel from column 
(1) to column (8) indicate that given the total average number of women in treatment and control 
areas, the number of missing women significantly decreased 2 more in the treatment area than that in 
the control area after the Arab Spring. In column (1) of Table 4, we only use the treatment dummy 
variable, the time dummy variable, and their interaction term.  Then we put control variables in column 
(2) and cluster the standard errors at the municipality level. Column (3) is our baseline result, to which 
we additionally add the municipality fixed effects the analysis. The control variables could change as 
the time goes by, especially after the Arab Spring. The potential changes of control variables could 
influence the missing women. Therefore, to control the potential changes of control variables after 
the Arab Spring, we add 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑎 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 to the model yielding the following Eq. (7). The results are in 
column (4), column (6), and column (8). The analytical results in these three columns with 
𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑎 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 are still consistent with the baseline result in column (3). These results in these three 
columns indicate that the control variables do not change after the Arab Spring. 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑎 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 × 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑎 + ∅𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑎 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡𝑎     (7) 
 
It could be too restrictive to put control variables in the regression analysis in a linear way. 
Therefore, we also relax the linear assumption on control variables. According to the reweighting 
method from Hirano et al. (2003) and the binary treatment variable, we use 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 = 1) to 
measure the probability of observation 𝑖 in the high protest intensity areas, the treatment group, based 
on those control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑎. Then we use the 
1
1−𝑝𝑖
 as weighting for observations in control group 
and use the 
1
𝑝𝑖
 as weighting for observations in treatment group. This is called propensity score 
reweighting (Hirano et al., 2003). According to this propensity score reweighting, the analytical results 
in column (5) and column (6) in Table 5 are also significant and consistent with all other results in 
Table 5. These findings imply that the linear form of 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑎  already manages the differences in 
characteristics well between treatment and control groups. We also check whether the survey 
weighting influences the analytical results or not. So, we add the survey weighting in columns (7) and 
(8) with or without controlling the potential changes of control variables. The results in these two 
columns are still significant and consistent with the results in other columns. 
We also use the relative death ratio calculated from equation (3) as the missing women 
measurement to further check the missing women reduction. These results are in the middle panel of 
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Table 5 and suggest that the missing women significantly and consistently decreased from column (1) 
to column (8), which is also consistent with the results in upper panel. All these results mean that 
compared to the men's death rate, the women's death rate significantly decreased around 15% after 
the Arab Spring. 
 
3.4.2 Robustness analysis 
To ensure the consistency of our findings, we implemented a number of robustness checks based on 
the baseline result model, which is the 3rd column in Table 5. 
Placebo test. It is important to know whether other elements could possibly influence missing 
women in both treatment and control groups before the Arab Spring. Following the literature that 
researched the effect of the Arab Spring on women's empowerment in family (Bargain et al., 2019), 
we implement a placebo test by setting an artificial intervention event before 2011. In this placebo 
test, we use 2010 as the artificial “Arab Spring revolution” and only use the sample before 2011. We 
use the same analytical methods in upper panel of Table 5 to analyze the changes in missing women 
from 2007 to 2010. In this placebo test, we set 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 1 for missing women observed in 2010 and 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 0 for missing women observed from 2007 to 2009. If the control area is good for comparing 
and our difference-in-differences is a good estimation, we should see the coefficient of the difference-
in-differences is not statistically different from 0. The lower panel in Table 5 is the results from this 
placebo test. The small and insignificant results from column (1) to column (8) reveal that no other 
possible elements might have influenced the missing women in both treatment and control groups 
before the Arab Spring. This result is also consistent with our common trend test in Figure 4. 
Regional effects and standard error clustering. To additionally check the fixed effects and 
standard error cluster, we alternatively cluster standard errors at governorate level using different 
bootstrap approaches and use different regional level fixed effects. Column (1) in Table 6 is the 
replication of analysis in column (3) of Table 5. In column (2) of Table 6, instead of using the 
municipality fixed effects, we use the governorate fixed effects whose result even indicates more 
reduced missing women at the 1% significant level. The reason could be the larger difference of protest 
at the governorate level. The standard error does not change a lot in column (2) at the governorate 
level. Then, we keep the municipality fixed effects but repeat our analysis by clustering at the 
governorate level in column (3), producing very similar results as in column (1). Next, from column 
(4) to column (6) we use the bootstrap at 800 replications, 1000 replications, and the ‘wild bootstrap’ 
𝑖 (Cameron et al., 2008; Roodman et al., 2018). All results of these bootstrap analyses are consistent 
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with the main result in column (1). These results in Table 6 imply that the regional characteristics do 
not influence the missing women. 
Alternative sample selection. The changes in marriage may also influence children’s deaths 
(Amato & Anthony, 2014). To further check whether marriage also affects the missing women before 
and after the Arab Spring, we dropped observations whose marriage lasted less than 4 years. In other 
words, we dropped those observations who divorced during the Arab Spring. The result is in column 
(1) of Table 7 which is still very close to our baseline result in Table 5. This result indicates that the 
changes in marriage do not influence the missing women.  
Respondents’ age influence. The women's age can also influence the baby's health conditions 
(UNICEF, 2008). To further check this potential effect of age, we only use respondents' information 
whose age is from 20 to 40 which is 93.4% of sample observations. The new estimated result on 
missing women in column (2) of Table 7 is also consistent with the baseline result in Table 5.  
Interview conditions. Because the missing women information was from the respondents' direct 
answers, the husband or other people present during the survey interview may influence the accuracy 
of missing women information. Their husbands or other family members may not want people to 
know existing bias or discrimination towards women. Therefore, we checked the potential influence 
from the presence of their husbands or other family members during the interview. We used the same 
analysis model, which is column (3) of Table 5, to analyze the subsample information without the 
presence of their husbands or any other family members, which is 70% of sample observations. The 
results in column (3) and column (4) of Table 7 are also significantly decreased and consistent with 
the main results in Table 5.  
Border governorates. For all the above analyses, we do not include the border governorates, 
because they have different population. Bedouins with nomadic traditions mainly inhabited those areas, 
and their ideas on the Arab Spring could be very different from people in the inner governorates. 
Even though some Bedouins also lived in the suburbs of the Egyptian capital of Cairo, the population 
portion is very small. The population density in these border governorates is also very small, which is 
only around 2% of the total population from 2007 to 2015 according to the related Census of Egypt 
(Statistical Yearbook, 2015). People in these border governorates focus on their own conflict, which 
is different from that in the Arab Spring (Bargain et al., 2019). Now to check the sensitivity of our 
analysis and whether the border governorates can influence our results, we do the same baseline 
analysis with border governorates. Therefore, in column (5) of Table 7, we checked the effects of the 
Arab Spring on missing women including these border governorates. The magnitude of this result in 
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the last column of Table 7 is now significantly reduced. However, while the magnitude of this result 
is smaller than the baseline result in Table 5, it is consistent with the main result.  
Groups’ classification based on SYPE. We have used the protest incidents intensity, which is 
from the revolution dataset, to classify the treatment and control groups and discovered many 
interesting and consistent results in all above analyses. Another interesting method to classify the 
treatment and control groups is to use the governorate-level women’s protest participation in the Arab 
Spring. Therefore, we use the 2014 Survey of Young People in Egypt, including around 10,000 women 
from 19 years old to 35 years old, not living in the border governorates. SYPE includes information 
about their protest participation experience and their attitude on all protests in the Arab Spring. We 
classify all women who had participated in those protests at least once and had a supportive attitude 
of those protests into the treatment group; otherwise, they are in the control group. This classification 
is 70% overlapped with the groups’ classification in the baseline analysis. Then, we still use the model 
from column (3) of Table 5 and the missing women from equations (1) and (2). The result from SYPE 
classification is in column (6) of Table 7, which indicates that the result is still significant and consistent 
with the baseline result.  
Missing women in urban and rural areas. During the Arab Spring, to get the government’s 
attention, people gathered in cities and big towns. In our data 60% of the treatment group is in cities 
or big towns. Therefore, we test the effects of the Arab Spring on missing women in urban and rural 
areas separately. In columns (7) and (8), we see the effects of the Arab Spring on missing women in 
urban areas is slightly stronger than in the rural areas.  
Different effects of different protests on missing women. Even though in Figure 2 the 
treatment and control groups’ classifications in different phases of the Arab Spring are 70% 
overlapped with each other and more than 70% overlapped with the group classification in Figure 1, 
the demands of different protests in different phases were different. Hence, according to the treatment 
and control groups classification in different phases during the Arab Spring revolution, we use the 
same analytical model, in column (3) of Table 5, to check the different effects of different protests on 
missing women. Then, corresponding to the treatment and control areas’ classification in Figure 2, we 
discovered the results in Table 8 indicating that the effects of protests in different phases are smaller 
than the main result, but they are still at the 1% significant level. These results are consistent with the 
news reports, which reported that different protests have different claims. Especially after previous 
Pres. Morsi tried to implement the decree giving him power to kill protesters and enforce some 
traditional Islamic requirements on women, protests focused more one maintaining and protecting 
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the gained women's rights (Knell, 2012). Therefore, we see the missing women significantly decreased 
more after Phase 3 in Table 8. 
Missing women in different age groups. We only checked the missing women in age1 group, 
whose age is from 0 to 1, in all previous analyses. Because the effects of protests affect all women’s 
living conditions, we checked the missing women in other age groups. There is no information on 
women who are older than 29, so we only test the missing women from 1 year old to 29 years old. We 
classify women in the following age groups: age1, the age of women from 0 to 1; age14, the age of 
women from 1 to 4; age59, the age of women from 5 to 9; age1014, the age of women from 10 to 14; 
age1519, the age of women from 15 to 19; age2024, the age of women from 20 to 24’ age2529, the 
age of women from 25 to 29. Column (1) of Table 9 is still the baseline result from column (3) in 
Table 5, which can help us compare the missing women with the results in other age groups. The 
missing women significantly decreased in age14, age59 and age2024. The decreased missing women is 
greater at the 1% significant level in age1, age14, and age59, but not age2024. Meanwhile, the missing 
women even increased in age1014 and age2529, but the increased missing women is very small in the 
age1014 group. The increased missing women is not big in age2529 group. The conclusion is that the 
effect of the Arab Spring is obvious and bigger for women in younger age groups. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Arab Spring is one of the most important events in recent Egyptian history and provides a good 
opportunity for a random experiment to analyze its effects on missing women. This paper firstly uses 
the missing women measurement, which was only used in one year, to estimate the effects of the Arab 
Spring across different years. This study is also the first attempt to study the heterogeneous changes 
in missing women during Egyptian Arab Spring based on geographical variation in the intensity of 
protests. This paper answers how the political protest affects the missing women and provides clarity 
on how different protests affect the missing women and how the Arab Spring affects the missing 
women in different age groups. The results point out that the Arab Spring causes 50% of the fall in 
missing women in the highly protest intensive areas. 
To summarize, we used a novel test based on the missing women through geographical variation 
in the intensity of protests - the high protest intensity area and the low protest intensity area before 
and after the Arab Spring. Besides the baseline DID regression analysis, we also tested the effects of 
the Arab Spring on missing women in different subsamples, different classifications on the treatment 
and control areas, different protests in different phases in the Arab Spring, and different age groups. 
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All these results revealed that the effect is still significant and robust. Interestingly, it reduced more 
missing women after Phase 3 in the Arab Spring. These results are not uniform within different age 
groups. The younger age groups experienced stronger effects from the Arab Spring. In contrast, the 































Figure 3. 1: Group’s classification in baseline analysis 
 
 
Notes: The baseline analysis treatment and control groups classification during the entire Arab Spring. 
This Figure does not include all border governorates which are Red Sea, New Valley, Matroh, North 
Sinai, and South Sinai.  
 




















Figure 3. 2: Groups’ classification in different phases 
 
 
Notes: The treatment and control groups classification in different phases in the Arab Spring. This 
Figure does not include all border governorates which are Red Sea, New Valley, Matroh, North Sinai, 
and South Sinai.  
 



















Figure 3. 3: Groups’ classification from SYPE 
 
 
Notes: The treatment and control group classification during the entire Arab Spring through SYPE 
dataset. This Figure does not include all border governorates which are Red Sea, New Valley, Matroh, 
North Sinai, and South Sinai.  
 



















Figure 3. 4: Missing women trend before and after the Arab Spring 
 
 
Note: These two lines represent the missing women from 2007 to 2014 in treatment and control areas 
for age1 group.  
 






















Table 3. 1: Summary statistics on demographic 
 Aggregate High Protest Low Protest Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female Respondent Information       
No Education 0.182 0.177 0.186 -0.009*** 
Primary Education 0.090 0.087 0.093 -0.005*** 
Secondary Education 0.570 0.559 0.579 -0.020*** 
Higher Education 0.158 0.177 0.143 0.035*** 
Work Rate 0.141 0.147 0.136 0.011*** 
Age 30 30.734 30.126 0.608*** 
 (6.51) (6.537) (6.487) (0.132) 
All Children Ever Born 2.787 2.823 2.766 0.056* 
 (1.50) (1.502) (1.499) (0.0299)      
Husband Summary Information   
No Education 0.136 0.138 0.135 0.003*** 
Primary Education 0.131 0.138 0.126 0.012*** 
Secondary Education 0.564 0.545 0.579 -0.033*** 
Higher Education 0.169 0.178 0.161 0.017***      
No Job 0.016 0.015 0.017 -0.002*** 
Tech Job 0.218 0.238 0.202 0.036*** 
Clerical 0.043 0.046 0.040 0.005*** 
Sale 0.049 0.048 0.050 -0.002*** 
Self-Agriculture 0.048 0.038 0.055 -0.018*** 
Employed Agriculture 0.072 0.063 0.079 -0.015*** 
Services 0.115 0.107 0.122 -0.015*** 
Skilled manual 0.341 0.344 0.339 0.006*** 
Unskilled manual 0.092 0.095 0.090 0.005*** 
Unknown 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.0002*** 
Husband Age 37 37.668 36.969 0.699*** 
 (8.28) (8.471) (8.158) (0.168)      
Household Information   
Women HH Head Rate 0.049 0.044 0.054 -0.010*** 
Muslim 0.963 0.965 0.962 0.003*** 
Christian 0.036 0.034 0.037 -0.003*** 
Unknown 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0002*** 
Urban 0.412 0.578 0.276 0.302*** 
Household Size 5.201 5.034 5.301 -0.267*** 
 (2.28) (1.726) (2.545) (0.0406) 
Women Size 1.099 1.066 1.120 -0.054*** 
 (0.42) (0.289) (0.481) (0.00717) 
Household Head Age 39.206 39.204 39.206 -0.002 
 (10.70) (10.398) (10.875) (0.212) 
Wealth 3.039 3.472 2.780 0.692*** 
 (1.348) (1.392) (1.251) (0.0265) 
N 13634 6145 7489   
Note: No education infers observations do not get any education.  Primary education means the highest 
education of the observation is the primary school education. Secondary education means the highest 
education of the observation is the secondary school education. Higher education infers that the highest 




education of the observation is higher than the secondary education, for instance the college education, 
master level education, or the Ph.D. education. Work rate is the number of women with job divided by the 
total number of women. Age is the average age of observations. "All children ever born" implies the average 
total number of children born by female observation until the survey time. All jobs’ classifications and 
information in this Table based on a country specific coding 
scheme. "No Job" is the rate of husband without job. "Tech job" infers the rate of husband with technology 
job, professional jobs, and managerial jobs. "Clerical" is the rate of husband with religious jobs. "Sale" is the 
rate of husband with sale jobs. "Self-Agriculture" is the rate of husband with his own farmland. "Employed 
Agriculture" is the rate of husband worked in other people's farmland. "Services" is the rate of husband with 
service jobs. "Skilled manual" is the rate of husband with the manual skilled jobs. "Unskilled manual" is the 
rate of husband with the manual unskilled jobs. "Unknown" means no information on the husband jobs. 
"Women Rate" is the rate of households with women household head. "Muslim" is the rate of households 
with Muslim religious belief. "Christian" is the rate of households with Christian religious belief. "Unknown" 
is the rate of households without knowing the information of religious belief. "Urban" is the rate of 
households living in the urban areas. "Household size" is the average number of household members. 
"Women size" is the average number of women in a household. "Household Head Age" is the average age 
of the household head. "Wealth" is the wealth index at households including poor, middle, richer, and richest. 
In this Table, it is the average number of households wealth index, the bigger the richer. "N" is the number 
of observations. Standard deviation in brackets. This table is the summary information of DHS.  
 















































Table 3. 2: Summary statistics on reference region and Egypt 
 Reference Region  Egypt 
Year 
Women 
DR Men DR Relative DR  
Women 
DR Men DR Relative DR 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
2007 0.004 0.005 0.812  0.016 0.016 1.019 
2008 0.004 0.004 0.815  0.017 0.015 1.096 
2009 0.004 0.004 0.817  0.015 0.011 1.334 
2010 0.004 0.004 0.819  0.017 0.016 1.076 
2011 0.004 0.004 0.827  0.016 0.012 1.347 
2012 0.003 0.004 0.829  0.014 0.011 1.252 
2013 0.003 0.004 0.833  0.013 0.012 1.128 
2014 0.003 0.004 0.838   0.010 0.009 1.077 
Note: Men DR, Women DR, and Relative DR represent men death ratio, women death ratio, 
and relative death ratio. Relative Death Ratio is calculated through Women Death Rate divided 
by Men Death Rate which is indicated in equation (3). In the reference region panel, we use 
the group of Established Market Economies as defined by the World Bank: Western Europe, 
Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on DHS in Egypt and the information of Western 
























Table 3. 3: Summary statistics on different regions in Egypt 















DR u π 
Missing 
women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
2007 0.010 0.010 1.064 0.008 553 1.366 0.020 0.020 1.006 0.016 673 2.647 
2008 0.012 0.010 1.162 0.008 741 2.572 0.021 0.020 1.085 0.016 783 4.156 
2009 0.014 0.012 1.200 0.010 506 2.330 0.015 0.010 1.464 0.009 603 4.067 
2010 0.017 0.017 0.977 0.014 609 2.776 0.017 0.015 1.162 0.012 747 4.313 
2011 0.013 0.009 1.412 0.008 605 3.323 0.018 0.013 1.322 0.011 770 5.146 
2012 0.011 0.009 1.160 0.008 630 1.891 0.017 0.013 1.300 0.011 863 5.171 
2013 0.009 0.011 0.862 0.009 665 0.211 0.016 0.012 1.298 0.010 869 5.050 
2014 0.007 0.008 0.849 0.006 456.5 0.037 0.012 0.010 1.216 0.008 1151 4.353 
Note: The definitions of Men DR, Women DR, and Relative DR, u, π refer to Table 2. u, calculated from 
equation (1), is the reference death rate of women in age1 group in different years in different interested areas. π is 
the starting population of women of age1 in different years in different interested areas.  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on DHS in Egypt and the information of Western Europe, Canada, United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan from WHO. 




Table 3. 4: Summary statistics on different regions in Egypt 
 Differences in Different Protest Intensity   
Year Women DR Men DR 
Relative 
DR u  
Missing 
women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2007 -0.00998*** -0.0105*** 0.0577*** -0.00851*** -120.0*** -1.282*** 
2008 -0.00972*** -0.00967*** 0.0772*** -0.00788*** -42.00*** -1.584*** 
2009 -0.000827*** 0.00159*** -0.262*** 0.00130*** -99.00*** -1.738*** 
2010 0.00104*** 0.00276*** -0.132*** 0.00226*** -138.0*** -1.537*** 
2011 -0.00455*** -0.00407*** 0.0884 -0.00336*** -165.0*** -1.823*** 
2012 -0.00601*** -0.00364*** -0.141*** -0.00302*** -233.0*** -3.280*** 
2013 -0.00695*** -0.00175*** -0.436*** -0.00146*** -204.0*** -4.839*** 
2014 -0.00559*** -0.00226*** -0.368*** -0.00189*** -694.5*** -4.316*** 
Note: The definitions of Men DR, Women DR, Relative DR, u, and π refer to Table 3.1. All 
these indexes are the differences between high and low protest intensity areas. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on DHS in Egypt and the information of Western Europe, 
Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan from WHO. 



































Table 3. 5: Main results, relative death ratio, Placebo 
Effect of Arab spring events on missing women: Main results. 
Missing women  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Period of interest: 2007-2014 
Post x Treat -2.009*** -2.010*** -1.994*** -1.995*** -1.999*** -2.007*** -1.984*** -1.998*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0164) (0.0177) (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0200) (0.0210) 
Observations 43,323 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 
R-squared 0.761 0.764 0.774 0.778 0.786 0.790 0.784 0.788          
Alternative missing women measurement: relative death ratio 
Post x Treat -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.145*** -0.141*** -0.144*** 
 (0.00281) (0.00296) (0.00315) (0.00343) (0.00320) (0.00335) (0.00375) (0.00393) 
Observations 43,323 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 
R-squared 0.231 0.240 0.269 0.277 0.270 0.280 0.272 0.281          
Placebo: 2007–2010 
Post x Treat -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.009 0.004 -0.009 
 (0.0170) (0.00784) (0.00896) (0.00943) (0.00950) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0112) 
Observations 21,030 20,985 20,985 20,985 20,985 20,985 20,985 20,985 
R-squared 0.707 0.718 0.735 0.737 0.693 0.696 0.724 0.726          
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipalities No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Post x Xi No No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
PS reweighting No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Survey weighting No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Cluster No Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. 
Note: Linear estimations based on 2014 DHS. Estimation of missing women is from the missing women calculation in equation 
(1). The treatment group are those governorates whose protest intensity is above-median protest intensity (based on the 
Egyptian Revolution database and defined as the governorate-level proportion of fatalities, injured, and arrested information).  
Control covariates includes wealth of households, work condition of respondents, urban, number of kids in the households, 
education of the respondents, age of wife and husband, husbands' work condition, religion, and kids birth order. We use 
different specifications: Column (1)- baseline result only with treatment group dummy, time dummy, and the interaction term 
of group dummy and the time dummy. Column (2)-adding individual control covariates and municipality cluster; Column (3)-
based on column (2), adding municipality fixed effects; Column (4)-based on column (3) adding interactions between POST 
and the controls; Column (5) & column (6)- use propensity score reweighting; Column (7) & column (8)- use DHS survey 
weighting. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at municipality level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 




Table 3. 6: Alternative standard error clustering  
Effect of the Arab Spring on Missing Women: Alternative Standard Error Clustering 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post x Treat -1.994*** -2.011*** -1.994*** -1.994*** -1.994*** -1.994*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0153) 
Observations 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 
R-squared 0.774 0.764 0.774 0.774 0.774 0.774 
Cluster Municip. Municip. Govern. Govern. Govern. Govern. 
Fixed effect Municip. Govern. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. 
Bootstrap No No No 800 rep. 1000 rep. Wild BS. 
Note: Linear estimations based on 2014 DHS. Estimation of missing women on the treatment, 
i.e., above-median protest intensity (based on the Egyptian Revolution database and defined as the 
governorate-level proportion of fatalities). We use a specification including the following controls: 
wealth, urban, education of the wife, education of the husband, age of wife and husband, husband 
in work, religion, birth cohort, interactions between POST and the controls. Fixed effects: we 
additionally control for municipality dummies (“Municip.”) or governorate dummies (“Govern.”). 
Cluster: standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level (“Municip.”) or 
governorate level (“Govern”). Clustering based on standard bootstrap (800 or 1000 replications) 













Table 3. 7:  Robustness check    














classification Urban Rural 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





 (0.0183) (0.0170) (0.0166) (0.0186) (0.0268) (0.0508) (0.0235) (0.0241) 
Observations 37,780 40,411 40,682 30,760 43,240 43,240 17,061 26,179 
R-squared 0.752 0.775 0.774 0.771 0.759 0.711 0.722 0.788 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. 
Cluster Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. 
Note: Estimation model, missing women estimation, control variables in this table are same in column (3) in main result table, 
Table 4. Subsample in column (1) is the marriage of respondents’ longer than 3 years. Subsample in column (2) is the age of 
respondents from 20 to 40. Subsample in column (3) is the interview condition without husband appearance. Subsample in 
column (4) is the interview condition for the respondent alone. Column (5) includes the border governorates. Column (5) 
includes all border governorates (Red Sea, Matrouh, New Valley, North Sinai and South Sinai) for analysis. Column (6) used 
the SYPE data set to classify the treatment and control groups. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality 
level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 




Table 3. 8: Time variation check 
Effect of the Arab spring events on missing women: Time variation check. 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x Treat -0.890*** -1.107*** -1.286*** -1.618*** 
 (0.0593) (0.0756) (0.0773) (0.0393) 
Observations 43,240 43,240 43,240 43,240 
R-squared 0.712 0.711 0.739 0.731 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipalities Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey weighting Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. 
Note: Linear estimations based on 2014 DHS. Estimation of missing woman is same in Table 1, 
i.e., above-median protest intensity in different protests phases (based on the Egyptian Revolution 
database and defined as the governorate-level proportion of fatalities). We use the specification 
of model 4 in Table 1 (controls include wealth, urban, education of the wife, age of wife and 
husband, husband in work, religion, municipality dummies, interactions between POST and the 
controls). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Phase 1, Protest against Mubarak's autocratic regime referring to column (1). 
Phase 2, Military rule from February 2011 to June 2012 referring to column (2). 
Phase 3, Muslim Brotherhood's rules, the president Mohammed Morsi, from June 2012 to July 
2013 referring to column (3).  



























Table 3. 9: Different ages 
Effect of Arab spring events on missing women: Different ages 
Missing women  age1 age14 age59 age1014 age1519 age2024 age2529 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Period of interest: 2007-2014 
Post x Treat -1.995*** -0.167*** -0.609*** 0.0722*** -0.0358*** -0.0843*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0177) (0.00418) (0.00137) (0.00141) (0.00173) (0.00104) (0.00367) 
Observations 43,240 82,766 87,982 71,574 50,631 28,228 9,520 
R-squared 0.778 0.255 0.345 0.292 0.340 0.506 0.273 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. 
Post x Xi Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey weighting No No No No No No No 
Cluster Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. Municip. 
Note: Estimation model, missing women estimation, control variables in this table are same in column (3) in main 
result table, Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
age1, the age of women from 0 to 1. 
age14, the age of women from 1 to 4. 
age59, the age of women from 5 to 9.  
age1014, the age of women from 10 to 14. 
age1519, the age of women from 15 to 19. 
age2024, the age of women from 20 to 24. 
age2529, the age of women from 25 to 29. 
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